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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
As provided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in finding that the debt to Cache Valley Bank was a 
marital debt? Did the district court improperly ignore UCA § 30-2-5 and illegally make 
Marian Olson liable for a personal debt of Brad Olson? Did the district court err in 
finding that the debt to Capitol Building Supply was a marital debt? Did the district court 
err in finding the value of the Nibley home to be $550,000? Did the district court err in 
allowing the corporate veil to be pierced? Did the district court err in awarding only 
$1000 in monthly alimony? Did the district court err in not allowing alimony to 
commence immediately? Did the district court err in requiring the parties to sell the 
Nibley home? Did the district court err in not allowing Jack Peterson to testify in full? 
Did the district court make an inequitable division of property? Did the district court err 
in determining that Appellant would not be awarded her attorney's fees in relation to this 
case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for review for this matter is that the appellate court should give no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review the legal conclusions reached 
by the trial court for correctness. See, Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, 997 (Utah App. 
2008) Findings of fact are set aside if they are found to be clearly erroneous by the 
appellate court. See, Ockey v. Lehmer 189 P.3d 51, 59-60 (Utah 2008). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
None. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5 
(1) Neither spouse is personally liable for the separate debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the other: 
(a) contracted or incurred before marriage; 
(b) contracted or incurred during marriage, except family 
expenses as provided in Section 30-2-9; 
(c) contracted or incurred after divorce or an order for separate 
maintenance under this title, except the spouse is personally 
liable for that portion of the expenses incurred on behalf of a 
minor child for reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses, and other similar necessities as provided in a court 
order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78B-12-212, or an 
administrative order under Section 62A-11-326; or 
'(d) ordered by the court to be paid by the other spouse under 
Section 30-3-5 or 30-4-3 and not in conflict with Section 15-
4-6.5 or 15-4-6.7. 
(2) The wages, earnings, property, rents, or other income of one spouse 
may not be reached by a creditor of the other spouse to satisfy a 
debt, obligation, or liability of the other spouse, as described under 
Subsection (1). 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(8) 
(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
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(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any 
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education 
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in 
accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its 
discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstance, attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing 
the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If 
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, 
the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a 
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable 
at the time of the divorce. 
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The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at 
the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's 
financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent 
spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper 
conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The purpose of this appeal is to review the decision of the trial court in relation to 
its final decree of divorce in dividing property, debt, and assets of the parties. Appellant 
Marian Olson did not receive equitable treatment by the trial court in the final divorce 
decree. There are several errors made by the trial court which are set forth in more detail 
in the body of this Opening Brief, the cumulative effect thereof are an inequitable 
detriment to Marian Olson. The single most significant inequity was the trial court's 
decision to render Marian Olson liable for corporate debts for which she had no personal 
liability. Moreover, the court should not have ordered the house to be sold, but should 
have awarded the house to Marin Olson with a lien in favor of Brad Olson's interest, if 
(ii) 
(iii) 
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any. In addition, the alimony awarded to Marian Olson was wholly insufficient and 
should not have been conditioned upon the sale of the home. Also, the overall 
distribution of the parties' assets was inequitable. Finally, there were several other errors 
by the trial court which are enumerated in more detail below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant Marian C. Olson and Appellee Bradley L. Olson were married in 
Smithfield, Utah on November 18, 1989. This is a second marriage for both Parties, and 
no issue were born to the Parties. R.667. 
2. Although the Parties have been married for more than 18 years, the Parties 
have been living separately since December 2004. R.667. 
3. Appellant Marian C. Olson resides in Nibley, Utah in the Parties' marital 
home located at 3818 South 250 East, Nibley, Utah. R.668. 
4. The Appellee lives in Las Vegas, Nevada and works in the construction 
industry. R.667. 
5. The Parties were shareholders in a corporation known as B&B Drywall, 
Inc. Appellant and Appellee were each 50% shareholders in that corporation. R.668. 
6. The corporation has gone into receivership and is no longer active. See, Tr. 
page 11, lines 1-25. 
7. Appellant had previously owned a home in Smithfield, Utah where the 
Parties had resided for the early part of their marriage. R.669. 
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8. In July 1998, Appellant Marian Olson sold that home and received more 
than $108,000.00 in equity which was immediately used for the Nibley home. R.669. 
9. Those funds were used to pay off the construction loan which had been 
obtained to build the Nibley home in 1998. R.669. 
10. The Parties moved into the Nibley home and they owned it as joint tenants 
free and clear. See, Tr. page 12, line 6. 
11. As president of the company and as the decision maker of day-to-day 
business affairs of B&B Drywall, Inc., Bradley Olson obtained various business loans 
from Cache Valley Bank for the benefit of B&B Drywall. The loans were made in 2004 
and 2005 for $250,000.00 and $50,000.00 respectively. See, Tr. page 153, lines 8-16. 
12. Cache Valley Bank did not require the Nibley home as collateral for the 
debts. Tr. page 458, lines 4-24. 
13. The only collateral which Cache Valley Bank took for the debts were the 
assets of B&B Drywall, Inc. Tr. page 458, lines 4-24 
14. Cache Valley Bank obtained a personal guaranty from Bradley Olson with 
regard to the above-referenced business debt but did not require or request a personal 
guaranty from Marian Olson. Tr. page 433, line 24 - page 434 line 5. 
15. During their marriage, Marian Olson had generally refused to become a co-
signer on business debt and had always refused to place her home up as collateral for 
business debt. Tr. 255, lines 3-14. 
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16. Marian Olson's intention in not allowing the home to be used as collateral 
and not personally guaranteeing business debts was to protect all of her interest in the 
Smithfield home and later all of her interest in the Nibley home. Tr. 255. 
17. After the divorce was filed Bradley Olson allowed for any interest that he 
had in the Nibley home to go to Cache Valley Bank by way of a trust deed. Tr. page 459, 
lines 1-8. 
18. Bradley Olson disposed of several assets prior to finalizing the divorce 
decree. See, Tr. page 216, line 22 - page 217 line 19. 
19. Brad sent a general letter on August 4, 2005 (3 days after the divorce 
petition was filed) to business associates notifying them that he was shutting down B&B 
Drywall, Inc. See, Tr. page 129, lines 3-6; Petitioner's Exhibit Tab 31. 
20. In the Decree of Divorce, the trial court did not award the marital home to 
either of the Parties but rather stated that the home should be sold to satisfy the debt to 
Cache Valley Bank. See, Decree of Divorce <p. R.688-89. The trial court did allow for 
the first $108,000.00 arising out of the sale to be awarded to Marian Olson. See, Tr. page 
711, lines 14-22. 
21. The trial court determined the value of the home to be worth $550,000.00. 
See, Tr. page 710, line 13 - page 711 line 13. 
22. Brad obtained advice from Cache Valley Bank's attorney, George Daines. 
See, Tr. page 194, lines 11-19 and Tr. page 225, lines 13-19. 
23. Cache Valley Bank admits that Marian Olson is not liable for the debt 
because she did not sign a personal guarantee. Tr. page 466, lines 6-9. 
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24. For convenience purposes Appellant Marian Olson is sometimes referenced 
herein simply as "Marian" and Appellee Bradley Olson is sometimes referenced herein as 
"Brad". 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in finding that Marian Olson was liable to Cache Valley Bank 
for the debt of B&B Drywall, Inc. when she was not an obligor for that debt. The court's 
ruling which requires the parties to sell the Nibley house and pay the full Cache Valley 
Bank trust deed violates Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5. The cumulative effect of the 
above was to illegally elevate the rights of Cache Valley Bank above the rights of Marian 
Olson. The court essentially allowed for the corporate veil to be pierced when it was not 
merited and without sufficient evidence. The trial court further erred in its rulings 
relating to alimony. Alimony should have been awarded to Marian in the amount of 
$2,000.00 per month and should have been awarded retroactively. The court's ruling 
regarding alimony should have commenced immediately rather than being conditioned 
upon the sale of the house. The Capitol Building Supply debt was not a marital debt, but 
the LKL debt was marital debt because both parties had personally guaranteed it. The 
record does not support the court's finding as to the value of the home. Bradley Olson 
should not benefit from selling assets in violation of the court's order. Attorney's fees 
should have been awarded to Marian Olson. Appellant's witness, Jack Peterson, was not 
allowed to testify as to the full scope of his testimony. The trial court should not have 
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made any orders regarding the protective order in this case. Judge Willmore should have 
been removed as the judge presiding over this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S RULING WHICH REQUIRES THE PARTIES TO 
SELL THE NIBLEY HOUSE TO PAY THE CACHE VALLEY BANK 
DEBT VIOLATES UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 30-2-5. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5 provides as follows: 
(1) Neither spouse is personally liable for the separate debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the other: (a) contracted or incurred before marriage; (b) 
contracted or incurred during marriage, except family expenses as provided 
in Section 30-2-9; (c) ...; (d) ordered by the court to be paid by the other 
spouse under Section 30-3-5 or 30-4-3 and not in conflict with Section 15-
4-6.5 or 15-4-6.7. 
(2) The wages, earnings, property, rents, or other income of one spouse 
may not be reached by a creditor of the other spouse to satisfy a debt, 
obligation, or liability of the other spouse as described under Subsection 
(i). 
The trial court's ruling with regard to Cache Valley Bank and the Nibley house directly 
violates the above referenced statute. Marian Olson was never personally obligated in 
any way, shape, or form on any loan to Cache Valley Bank, much less the amount of 
$341,159.76. Marian Olson did not sign any loan documents in favor of Cache Valley 
Bank. Tr. page 466, lines 6-9. Cache Valley Bank knew when it extended the loans to 
B&B Drywall, Inc. that Marian Olson was not making herself personally liable and 
further knew that the house was not collateral for the debt. Id. Bradley Olson also knew 
this same information. The Nibley house was free and clear of any and all debt at the 
time that the divorce action was filed. As of the date of the divorce action, August 1, 
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2005, there was no debt, lien, or other obligation encumbering the Nibley house. Tr. 
page 12, line 6. The trial court found that the house was worth $550,000.00 and yet 
despite that, Marian Olson is now coming out of the divorce with only $108,000.00 and is 
under a stayed order to be evicted from the house which the parties previously owned 
free and clear. 
Brad incurred more than $300,000.00 in debt to Cache Valley Bank during the 
parties' marriage. He was a personal guarantor on the B&B Drywall, Inc. debt in the 
same amount. Tr. 466, lines 6-9. B&B obtained loans from Cache Valley Bank in 2003 
for $100,000.00, in 2004 for $250,000.00, and 2005 for $50,000.00. Brad personally 
guaranteed those loans. Tr. page 433, line 24 - page 434 line 5. Marian did not. Id. 
Therefore under Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5, these were debts incurred by Brad Olson 
during the course of their marriage. These loans were incurred for business expenses of 
B&B Drywall. Tr. 425 line 22 - page 426, line 12. In other words, these loans were not 
for family expenses. 
The effect of the court's ruling is to make Marian Olson personally liable for the 
separate debt of Bradley Olson to Cache Valley Bank. Such an outcome is in direct 
conflict with Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5(2) which specifically states that the property 
of one spouse may not be reached by a creditor of the other spouse to satisfy a debt, 
obligation, or liability of the other spouse. Moreover, it is insufficient in and of itself to 
elevate the claims of Cache Valley Bank over the rights of the Parties to the divorce. 
Further, it only benefits Bradley Olson to use assets of the marital estate to pay for 
Bradley Olson's personal debt. Marian Olson specifically and intentionally, during the 
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course of the marriage, avoided signing personal guarantees of business debt and 
specifically and intentionally avoided allowing the house to be encumbered by business 
debt (except with LKL Associates). Tr. page 255, lines 3-14. There is no written 
document which was signed by Marian Olson establishing her alleged liability to Cache 
Valley Bank. Tr. page 434, lines 1-5. 
In Finlinson v. Finlinson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994) the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that a similar ruling by a trial court in favor of a third party was 
inappropriate. The trial court had ordered the divorce parties to sign a quit claim deed of 
a lot which had been titled in the parties' names. The court ordered that the property 
should be awarded to a non-party to the action. In overturning that ruling, the appellate 
court stated, "Even so, absent some kind of intervention, a divorce action deals only with 
rights as between the parties to the marriage and does not operate to assert the rights of a 
third-party." Id. at 850. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that 
the lot was not marital property and reversed the order regarding the quit claim deed. 
The Court of Appeals further ordered that the trial court should make an equitable 
division of the lot as a marital asset between the parties to the divorce action. 
In this case, the trial court has abused its discretion by making an order that the 
Nibley home be sold to Cache Valley Bank. R.775. The trial court only has the authority 
to determine as between the parties to the divorce action who owns the property and to 
allocate the debts. The trial court has not made a direct finding that Marian Olson is 
responsible for the Cache Valley Bank debt. However, the effect of the court's order is to 
do that very thing. There are insufficient findings nor is there sufficient law to support 
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elevating the rights of Cache Valley Bank above those of Marian Olson. In fact, it is in 
direct contravention of law to allow Marian Olson to be liable for the Cache Valley Bank 
debt when Cache Valley Bank did not require her personal guaranty and when Cache 
Valley Bank did not require a security interest in the Nibley house. See, Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-2-5. Subsection (2) of § 30-2-5 is clear that the property of one spouse 
may not be reached by a creditor of the other spouse to satisfy a debt of the other spouse. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARIAN OLSON 
WAS LIABLE TO CACHE VALLEY BANK FOR THE DEBT OF B&B 
DRYWALL, INC. WHEN SHE DID NOT PERSONALLY GUARANTEE 
THE DEBT. 
The court's ruling purportedly uses a theory of commingling to accomplish what 
the statute expressly disallows. This court should reverse that ruling. It is undisputed 
that Marian Olson did not sign a personal guaranty in favor of Cache Valley Bank, but 
that Bradley Olson did sign such a document. Tr. page 433, line 24 - page 434, line 5. 
Appellee has argued and will likely continue to argue that the decision of the court 
in Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (UT. App. 1987) allowed the trial court to pierce the 
corporate veil as persuasive authority supporting the result of this case. Indeed, the 
Colman case did allow for the corporate veil to be pierced and the husband's corporate 
assets to be distributed as part of the marital estate. However, that theory and finding in 
Colman is much different from what the trial court did in this matter. The trial court 
made Marian Olson liable for corporate debts when she had not personally guaranteed 
them! Apparently, the trial court was piercing the corporate veil to accomplish this 
result. The trial court did not mention veil piercing in its findings of fact and conclusions 
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of law. While the court did mention commingling, the court did not review the elements 
of veil-piercing and certainly has no precedent for doing so. In the Colman case the issue 
was whether or not the wife could pierce the corporate veil to reach assets that the 
husband claimed belonged to one of his companies and not to him. In Colman, the 
husband had been using a corporate veil as a shield to protect him from having to split 
assets. The Colman court pierced that corporate veil. In this case, the husband is 
attempting to use the corporate veil as a sword to obligate his former spouse for debts that 
she did not sign or incur. There is no precedent for using a corporate veil theory in this 
matter. 
"Ordinarily a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity from its 
stockholders." Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973). Marian 
refused to personally guarantee the Cache Valley Bank loans. Tr. 255, lines 3-14. Brad 
could have decided not to get the loan when she refused the personal guarantee. Now 
Brad is trying to get the legal system to change that decision which he made. 
To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two 
circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, 
instead, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an inequity. Norman v. Murray 
First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). 
Bradley Olson had the burden of proving his theory that the corporate veil should 
be pierced. In an effort to meet his burden, Mr. Olson made assertions such as that 
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several personal items were purchased with B&B funds (Tr. 519, line 25 - page 520, 
lines 7) or that certain "trades" were made with subcontractors in connection with the 
construction of the Nibley home. Tr. 201, lines 8-23. Mr. Olson failed to admit any 
evidence other than his own self-serving statements. This is insufficient to support a 
finding of veil-piercing. The record is devoid of proof to justify the trial court's ruling 
that the corporate entity should be disregarded. No evidence was admitted to establish 
the corporation's neglect of statutory formalities nor was any evidence received to the 
effect that the observance of the corporate entity would "sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice, or produce an inequitable result." Messickv. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 678 
P.2d 791 (Utah 1984). Therefore, no justification exists for piercing the veil between 
B&B Drywall, Inc. and its shareholders. Indeed, B&B Drywall, Inc. was the subject of a 
receivership. See, Tr. page 11, lines 1-25—if it had no separate corporate existence, 
there would be no need for such a veil piercing theory. "Courts must balance piercing 
and insulating policies and will only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil." 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 p.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) see 
also Cojman at 786. 
Bradley Olson made no claims that Marian Olson defrauded Cache Valley Bank. 
Therefore, he cannot make her share in his liability as it relates to Cache Valley Bank. In 
an alter ego case by the Utah Supreme Court where it found that in the absence of any 
charge of fraud on the part of the owners, it was error to make the stockholders 
individually liable on contract with a corporation. See, Grover v. Gam, 464 p.2d 598, 
602-03 (Utah 1970). 
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The trial court's ruling violates Marian Olson's rights and deprives her of property 
and significant equity which rightfully belong to her. This further appears to be a 
violation of Marian Olson's due process rights. The trial court is taking property which 
belongs to her and giving it to Cache Valley Bank and Bradley Olson. 
Another interesting result of the Colman case is that the court of appeals 
determined that every element of the veil piercing theory had been tried and evidence had 
been admitted concerning the same. In this matter involving the Olsons, the only 
evidence admitted had to do with comingling of assets but the other elements of the veil 
piercing theory were not discussed. 
In order to gain the result that Mr. Olson desires regarding the veil piercing theory 
against Mrs. Olson, he has to take inconsistent positions. In the receivership case, B&B 
Drywall had a large amount of debt. If his theory regarding veil piercing is true, then he 
is personally liable for all of those debts as well. On the contrary, he is only using his 
veil piercing theory when it is to his advantage which is that Marian Olson should 
become a co-obligor with him on the Cache Valley Bank debt. Veil piercing should not 
be used as a sword as between former spouses. 
Because this is a case in equity, the standard of review is such that it allows this 
Court to conduct an independent examination of the facts in the record and to modify or 
make new findings based upon that record. First Security Bank of Utah v. Demiris, 354 
P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1960). 
The B&B shareholders and officers did hold corporate meetings, maintained a 
corporate book and therefore did observe corporate formalities. See, Tr. page 252, lines 
15 
2-21. B&B Drywall also filed a separate tax return prepared by an outside accountant. 
Tr. page 439-442. 
No precedent found by Appellant supports the drastic order of the trial court 
forcing the Nibley home to be sold to pay off the Cache Valley Bank debt. The result 
which the trial court reached would turn divorce cases on their head by converting them 
into corporate veil piercing cases in favor of one creditor or another. 
III. THE COMBINED EFFECT OF THE COURT'S RULINGS WAS TO 
ILLEGALLY ELEVATE THE RIGHTS OF CACHE VALLEY BANK 
AND BRADLEY OLSON ABOVE THOSE OF MARIAN OLSON. 
The trial court is statutorily prohibited from violating Utah Code Annotated § 30-
2-5. That statute declares that neither spouse is personally liable for the separate debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the other, subject to specific provisions which are 
inapplicable in this situation. In other words, the statute governs this situation and the 
statute does not allow for the veil piercing result reached by the trial court. The trial 
court went way outside its bounds when it ordered the sale of the house and the proceeds 
to be paid to Cache Valley Bank. While the court did not expressly find that Marian 
Olson was liable for the debt of Cache Valley Bank, the result of the sale order was to 
make her responsible for half of that debt. The trial court does not have the authority to 
engage in such a ruling. The trial court would have to receive specific legislative 
authority to pierce the corporate veil in order to accomplish such. The court should be 
required to award the house to Marian Olson and award a lien for any interest of Brad 
Olson. The debt owing to Cache Valley Bank was clearly a business debt personally 
guaranteed by Bradley Olson which arose well after the parties built the Nibley home. 
The events which supposedly happened with regard to the Nibley home, i.e. the 
allegations of alleged comingling do not even relate to Cache Valley Bank's existing 
debt. Cache Valley Bank was paid in full for the construction loan from many years ago. 
Tr. p. 247. The trial court made a huge leap from the alleged comingling many years ago 
to the current Cache Valley Bank debt. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULINGS RELATING TO 
ALIMONY. 
With regard to alimony, the trial court ruled that Brad Olson was to pay Marian 
Olson $1,000.00 per month beginning 30 days from the date of closing from the sale of 
the Nibley home. R.694, ^15. These rulings concerning alimony do not meet the 
standards of Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(8). (See pages 2-4 for full statutory text.) 
A. ALIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO MARIAN IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $2000 PER MONTH. 
The alimony awarded to Marian Olson was very inadequate given Bradley Olson's 
income of $96,500.00 per year plus bonuses. See, Tr. page 119, lines 2-5. He 
acknowledged that he had received upwards of $30,000.00 in bonuses for calendar year 
2007 and that his income was $96,500.00. See, Tr. page 119, lines 5-15. In light of 
Marian Olson's income of $46,805.00 per year, (Brad's Trial Exhibit Tab #2) the 
alimony award is extremely deficient. Under that ruling Brad still has (without 
considering bonuses) over $84,000.00 ($96,000.00 - $12,000.00) per year worth of 
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income, while Marian Olson only has $58,805.00 ($46,805.00 + $12,000.00) per year. 
This is wholly inequitable and should be modified by the court of appeals or remanded. 
This is a disparity of over $37,000.00 without taking the bonuses into account and given 
the fact that Brad contributes about twenty percent for retirement. Tr. 530, lines 21-23. 
The award of $2,000.00 per month alimony would basically equalize the income statutes 
of the parties. 
B. ALIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
RETROACTIVELY. 
Instead of ruling that the alimony would commence immediately, the court ruled 
that the alimony should commence 30 days after the closing of the sale of the Nibley 
home. R.694 ^|15. Because the Nibley home has not closed, no alimony has been paid to 
date. The alimony should have been awarded retroactively to the date that Brad Olson 
began his employment for Martin Harris Construction in Las Vegas which was 2006. 
Marian Olson has been struggling to live month to month since the divorce petition was 
filed on August 1, 2005 and Mr. Olson has had the benefit of a huge income at least since 
his employment at Martin Harris Construction in Las Vegas. He is even contributing 
twenty percent of his income to retirement. Tr. 489, lines 2-6 and Tr. 530, lines 21-23. 
The equitable approach to the alimony would be for Marian Olson to receive alimony 
effective as of the date that he obtained employment. 
There is no legal justification for the court to condition the commencement of 
alimony based upon her acquiescing to the sale of the house. Clearly this is inequitable 
and had the effect of coercion towards Marian Olson into feeling that she should 
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acquiesce in the trial court's ruling just so that she could begin receiving the alimony due 
to her. The alimony award should have commenced immediately on the entry of the 
divorce decree and should have been effective as of the date of Brad's employment. 
C. COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD WAS INEQUITABLE. 
The trial court stated that it had applied Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 with regard 
to alimony. Tr. page 718 lines 11-15. However, the court did not take into consideration 
the parties' standard of living at the time of their separation, the husband's adultery, or 
Marian Olson' lack of marketable skills. Mr. Olson admitted to committing adultery 
which lead to the parties' divorce. Tr. 126, lines 18-19. The court did not take this into 
consideration. Moreover, where a wife of advanced age has few marketable skills and 
where the husband is in an excellent position to provide adequate continuing support to 
the wife, the alimony should be increased. See, Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985). 
The standard of living to which the parties had become accustomed at the time of 
the divorce was better than the court's $1,000.00 alimony award. With Marian's income 
of approximately $3,900.00 per month from Utah State University and the expenses of 
maintaining and keeping a home as well as for her personal expenses and expenses to 
gain an education to increase her marketability the alimony award should be at least 
$2,000.00 per month. 
V. THE DEBT TO CAPITOL BUILDING SUPPLY WAS NOT A 
MARITAL DEBT; BUT THE LKL DEBT WAS A MARITAL DEBT. 
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The division of the debt to LKL Associates and Capitol Building Supply is 
inequitable. The court ordered Marian Olson to assume the entire indebtedness to LKL 
Associates and Brad Olson to assume the entire debt to Capitol Building Supply. R.694 f^ 
16. This result is extremely inequitable. The findings of fact show that the Capitol 
Building Supply debt was $61,774.00 and the LKL debt was $40,965.00. R.674. Both of 
these debts were business debts which were also personally guaranteed. However, 
Marian Olson only personally guaranteed the LKL debt while Brad Olson personally 
guaranteed both of the debts. Tr. page 182, lines 1-4 and Tr. page 187, lines 17-19. 
Therefore, because both parties were responsible for the LKL debt, it is not unreasonable 
to conclude that the LKL debt was a joint debt to be shared between them. However, the 
debt to Capitol Building Supply cannot reasonably be concluded to be marital debt in that 
the Capitol Building Supply debt was incurred by the business and was personally 
guaranteed by Brad Olson only. The same arguments which are mentioned in sections I, 
II, and III of this brief apply to these debts as well. Veil-piercing cannot apply to violate 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5. Ultimately, the court should have determined the Capitol 
Building Supply debt to be Brad's debt only in light of Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5 
and that the LKL debt should be shared between the two parties. 
VL THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING AS 
TO THE VALUE OF THE HOME. 
The court determined the value of the Nibley home to be $550,000.00. Tr. pages 
710-11. The only independent evidence admitted at the trial was the appraisal performed 
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by Dustin Singleton showing that the fair market value of the property at approximately 
the time of filing of the divorce was $480,000.00. See, Tr. page 37, lines 1 - 16, and Tr. 
p. 65, lines 20-25. The only additional evidence submitted was that there was a leak in 
the foundation which would require repair in the twenty-five to thirty-five thousand 
dollar range. See, Tr.page 25, lines 17-25. From this evidence the court then made a 
finding of fact that the home is worth $550,000.00. R.670 t 12. The fact that Mr. 
Singleton testified that during 2006 and 2007 there was general appreciation in real estate 
in Cache Valley of 5 - 10% annually, is not evidence as to the value of the subject home 
and the trial court's factual conclusion as to the value of the home is not supported. The 
most that the trial court could have awarded as the value of the home would be 
$480,000.00 assuming the repairs were performed. However, the trial court went from 
$480,000.00 to $550,000.00 without an actual appraisal. Brad testified that he thought 
the house was worth at least $550,000.00, but provided no information other that his own 
opinion. See, Tr. p. 215, lines 23-24. Thus, the record does not support this valuation. 
The court had, during discovery, ordered Bradley Olson to pay half the cost of an 
appraisal in preparation for trial. Marian Olson paid her half to Dustin Singleton in 
September of 2007. Bradley Olson never made his half payment of the appraisal. Tr. 
page 43, line 5 - page 44, line 23. Therefore, Dustin Singleton never did do a new 
appraisal on the property. Bradley Olson should have been sanctioned by the court for 
his failure to participate in paying for the appraisal as he had been ordered to do so. 
Instead, the court not only ignored Brad's failure to pay half the appraisal price, the court 
rewarded Mr. Olson for his failure to participate in payment for the appraisal process by 
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allowing the home to be valued at an amount much higher than the appraised amount thus 
giving more apparent ability to pay off the debt of Cache Valley Bank. 
Appellant had made an oral motion in limine at the beginning of the trial asking 
the court to exclude any evidence submitted by Bradley Olson concerning the value of 
the property. Tr. 18. The court should have imposed such a sanction or some other 
sanction against Bradley Olson for his failure to participate in the costs of that appraisal. 
Instead the trail court denied Marian's motion in limine. Tr. 304, lines 2-10. 
VII. BRAD SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM SELLING ASSETS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE COURT ORDER. 
Brad admitted to violating the court's order not to dispose of assets. Tr. page 216, 
line 22 - page 217, line 19. However, the court ignored this conduct and seemingly 
factored it into the final ruling. The court should not have turned a blind eye but should 
have sanctioned him for so doing. 
VIII. THE DIVISION OF THE PARTIES' REMAINING ASSETS WAS 
INEQUITABLE. 
It is anticipated that the Court of Appeals will agree with Appellant's position that 
the trial court erred in relation to Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5. If so, then the case 
should likely be remanded for a re-allocation of the remaining marital assets. However, 
even apart from the house distribution, the trial court's ruling regarding division of the 
other assets of the estate is inequitable. For instance, the court initially gave some 
consideration to an appreciation or interest factor on Marian's $108,000.00 pre-marital 
investment into the marital home. Tr. 711-12. But the court offset that amount by 
allegations of disposal of tools in the Nibley shed, cash, and guns. Tr. 712. Marian gave 
an accounting of the cash and did not dispose of the tools from the Nibley shed. The 
court awarded Marian the timeshare and the tools inside the Nibley shed but did not affix 
a value to the tools in the shed. Tr. 712. On the other hand, the court awarded to Brad 
the tools in the Hyrum shed, the coin collection, and gave Brad first preference relating to 
the personal property. 
The court should have awarded B&B Drywall, Inc. to Bradley Olson give the fact 
that he sent the August 4, 2005 letter terminating the company. Petitioner's Exhibit Tab 
31. His actions caused the company to go out of business when it could have been saved 
by the parties as a going concern. With regard to the Hyrum storage unit, the value 
assessed by the court thereto was completely random and was not based upon any 
evidence. As to the coin collection, the court admitted an arbitrary value was given to 
them — $15,000.00. Tr. 713, lines 14-18. The coins which were awarded to Brad were 
worth $50,000.00. R.284, lines 14-18. 
In summary, the court's disposition of personal property was random and 
inequitable. 
IX. THE COURT ERRED IN DISALLOWING EVIDENCE FROM JACK 
PETERSON. 
The court erred in disallowing certain testimony from a fact witness, Mr. Jack 
Peterson. Mr. Peterson is a CPA but was not in attendance to give an opinion about the 
facts at hand. Tr. 417, lines 18-19. During the course of the parties' marriage, Jack 
Peterson had done an analysis of Mr. Olson's income in order to respond to Mr. Olson's 
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prior spouse relating to support issues of his prior marriage (prior to Marian Olson). Tr. 
414. The purpose of the anticipated testimony from Mr. Peterson was to show a factual 
analysis of Brad Olson's earnings during the marriage. Tr. 414. The court took Brad's 
counsel's word that Mr. Peterson was an expert witness and not a factual witness. Tr. 
415. Mr. Peterson was not giving testimony as to Brad's current income, rather Mr. 
Peterson would have testified as to Brad's actual income during the time that the parties 
were married in relation to a post-divorce proceeding with Brad's prior wife. Tr. 416. 
The court erred in considering Mr. Peterson an expert witness and omitting his testimony 
and should have allowed Mr. Peterson's testimony as a factual witness concerning the 
timeframe in question. Tr. 415, lines 1-17. 
X. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO MARIAN 
OLSON. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3(1) allows this court to award attorneys fees to a 
party. The claims made by Brad Olson are not based upon equitable arguments and were 
intended to the detriment of Marian Olson. He has not operated in good faith towards a 
resolution of this matter believing that the trial court would award him a better deal if he 
went to trial. His unreasonable approach to this has caused significant attorneys fees to 
accrue and this court should award Marian Olson's attorneys fees for having to defend 
against the unreasonable positions taken by Mr. Olson. 
XL THE PROTECTIVE ORDER ISSUE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED. 
The court erred in combining a ruling from the protective order case with the 
divorce case and had no grounds to enter such an order. Tr. 709, lines 16-18. In a 
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separate case (054100378), the trial court had issued a protective order dated August 25, 
2005 in light of potential retribution from Bradley Olson towards Marian Olson. Marian 
Olson had been threatened for her life on a previous occasion and Mr. Olson had been 
told not to own any guns in light of a previous commitment to a mental hospital. See, 
Marian's Trial Exhibit Tab 8. Marian Olson was continuing to live in fear for threats 
which had been made against her. 
Despite this, the court in the divorce case took action to dismiss the protective 
order in the separate protective order case which was not before the court at the time of 
the divorce hearing. The point in time of the trial court's ruling on the divorce was a very 
emotional time for both parties and one of the key moments in which the protective order 
was still needed to maintain the peace between the parties. The fact that the court would 
dismiss the protective order unilaterally and without following the proper procedures was 
the cause of significant emotional distress to Marian Olson since the order was lifted. 
XII. JUDGE WILLMORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM 
PRESIDING OVER THIS CASE. 
After the trial of this case Judge Judkins recused himself from presiding over this 
case and Judge Thomas Willmore was assigned. However, Marian Olson became aware 
of certain facts regarding Judge Willmore which made her uncomfortable regarding his 
continued involvement in this case. Therefore, Marian Olson filed a motion for 
reassignment of the case from Judge Willmore to a new judge on or about October 29, 
2008. The basis for the requested reassignment is that the local newspaper published in 
the Logan area printed a marriage announcement showing that the Honorable Thomas 
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Willmore recently presided at a marriage ceremony for a bride and groom who have close 
connections to this case. The groom in that ceremony was counsel for Cache Valley 
Bank, Jonathan Thomas. Tr. 667, line 2 and Tr. 421, lines 24-25. The bride in that 
ceremony is the daughter of counsel for Bradley Olson, Joseph Chambers. Jonathan 
Thomas has attended hearings in this case. Joseph Chambers has attended all of the 
hearings. This case deals with significant connections to Cache Valley Bank given the 
fact that Cache Valley Bank is a significant creditor of Bradley Olson who is attempting 
to collect from Marian Olson as well. 
Judicial Canon 3.E(1) states that a "Judge shall enter a disqualification in a 
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned..." Based 
upon the newspaper article it is clear that there exists a personal relationship that Judge 
Willmore has with counsel for Cache Valley Bank and counsel for Bradley Olson. The 
court has stated and Appellant has no reason to believe otherwise that Judge Willmore 
has not received any remuneration from either of the parties or that he has not discussed 
thecase with any of those parties. See, Appendix 4. While this is helpful, it does not 
lessen the personal relationship which clearly exists by virtue of a judge presiding at a 
marriage ceremony for parties closely connected to a case while the case is pending. The 
clear existence of a personal relationship, whether an influence is actually had on this 
case or not, whether intentional or unintentional, is a risk that Marian Olson should not 
have to take. The Judicial Canons require a judge to disqualify himself in a proceeding in 
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Meaning no disrespect to 
Judge Willmore, Marian Olson reasonably questions his impartiality given his close 
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connection to two parties on the other side of a dispute from her. There are plenty of 
other judges including judges outside the first district who could easily handle this case 
and with whom there are no questions as to impartiality. The trial court erred in entering 
its memorandum decision and order dated January 30, 2009 and which is attached as 
Appendix 4 hereto. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding that Marian Olson was liable to Cache Valley Bank 
for the debt of B&B Drywall, Inc. when she was not an obligor for that debt. The court's 
ruling which requires the parties to sell the Nibley house and pay the full Cache Valley 
Bank trust deed violates Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-5. The cumulative effect of the 
above was to illegally elevate the rights of Cache Valley Bank above the rights of Marian 
Olson. The court essentially allowed for the corporate veil to be pierced when it was not 
merited and without sufficient evidence. The trial court further erred in its rulings 
relating to alimony. Alimony should have been awarded to Marian in the amount of 
$2,000.00 per month and should have been awarded retroactively. The court's ruling 
regarding alimony should have commenced immediately rather than being conditioned 
upon the sale of the house. The Capitol Building Supply debt was not a marital debt, but 
the LKL debt was marital debt because both parties had personally guaranteed it. The 
record does not support the court's finding as to the value of the home. Bradley Olson 
should not benefit from selling assets in violation of the court's order. Attorney's fees 
should have been awarded to Marian Olson. Appellant's witness, Jack Peterson, was not 
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allowed to testify as to the full scope of his testimony. The trial court should not have 
made any orders regarding the protective order in this case. Judge Wilimore should have 
been removed as the judge presiding over this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of April, 2009. 
M. Darin Hammond 
Attorneys for Appellant Marian Olson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Facsimile: (435) 752-3556 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN C. OLSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRADLEY L. OLSON, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 054100358 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
This matter came for Trial on February 6 and 7, 2008, and Oral Argument on February 28, 
2008, before the District Court, the Honorable Clint S. Judkins, District Judge presiding. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorneys, Kenyon D. Dove and M. Darin Hammond, 
Smith Knowles,P.C, Ogden, Utah. The Respondent was present and represented by his attorney 
Joseph M. Chambers, Harris, Preston & Chambers, Logan, Utah. The parties submitted certain 
evidence, including testimony, proffers, exhibits, and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and the Court having considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and having rendered 
its decision from the bench on Wednesday, April 16, 2008, and having previously entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the following Decree of Divorce: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Decree of Divorce. The Petitioner is hereby granted a decree of divorce from the 
Respondent, the same to become final upon signing of the same by the Court. 
2. Niblev Home. Initially the Court ordered the Nibley home to be sold and the proceeds 
distributed as follows: First, costs of repair of the foundation in order to get the home into a saleable 
condition; Second, costs of sale including real estate commission, title insurance, and similar costs; 
FNTD JUL 2 1 . 4 
[arris, Preston 
i Chambers, P.C. 
1 Federal Avenue 
,ogan, Utah 84321 
435) 752-3551 
Third, the sum of $108,000.00, to the Petitioner representing her premarital interest in the property; 
Fourth, the indebtedness due to Cache Valley Bank; and Fifth, the balance to be divided among the 
parties equally with a caveat that from the Petitioners' portion of the proceeds the balance of the 
judgment equalizing the parties interest as discussed below in the amount of $1,083.00, to be taken 
from the Petitioners' interest unless she has otherwise obtained possession of the guns awarded to 
the Respondent and returned them to the Respondent, in which event the value of the guns will 
reduce the amount of $ 1,083.00 accordingly. Prior to entry of this order the Respondent sought and 
was granted an order (Temporary Order)requiring the parties to accept an offer made by Cache 
Valley Bank. The Court confirms said Temporary Order in this Decree. 
3. Timeshare. The Court awards the Worldmark Timeshare (formerly Trend West 
Timeshare) to the Petitioner, subject to the Petitioner being responsible for any and all costs, 
expenses, or indebtedness thereon. 
4. Coin Collection. The Respondent is awarded the coin collection including any and 
all supplies and ancillary equipment associated with the coin collection, presently in the Petitioners' 
possession. The Court intends the coin collection to include any and all supplies associated with 
coin collecting, new microscope for coins, coin paper, plastic, and box holders, paper coin holders, 
and stapler for holders, coin computer software, coin books and brochures, coin desk 
lamp/magnifying glass, paper money collection and collectibles, US Quarter & Stamp Collection and 
Binder, miscellaneous coins and collectibles left in factory safe. 
5. Property in Possession of the Other Party. Any personal property awarded to the other 
party currently in one of the parties possession shall be delivered to their attorney with appropriate 
arrangements for delivery by the attorneys to the parties other attorney. 
6. Equipment in Hyrum Storage Shed. The Respondent is awarded the equipment and 
other items currently in the Hyrum storage shed. 
7. Equipment in Niblev and Cash in Safe. The Respondent is awarded the equipment 
and other goods in the Nibley shop, the money in the safe. 
8. 2001 Expedition. The Petitioner is awarded the 2001 Expedition. 
9. 1989 Ford Truck. The Respondent is awarded the 1989 Truck. The Court is 
cognizant that the same has been impounded and sold at impound in the State of Nevada. 
10. Retirements. The Court orders that all the retirements of the parties, including, but 
not limited to: 1) the NorthTrack Investment Funds Account #0002319523 owned by the Petitioner 
Account; 2) the Petitioners' 401 k-IRA with AGI-Valic Account # not provided; 3) the 401 k through 
Utah State University/Utah Retirement Systems Account #W88915950, as well as 4) Petitioners' 
retirement annuity through the Utah Retirement Systems Account #W88915950; 5) the Respondents' 
401 k through his employment (MH 401 k) Member ID #4058; 6) the IRA with Janus Funds Account 
#200606926-3 & 203504479;and, 7) the NorthTrack Investment Funds Account #6000204526 
owned by the Respondent, shall be divided pursuant to the Woodward formula, the costs to prepare 
the various Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, and Domestic Relations Order, to be borne by the 
Respondent. In the event, the parties can stipulate as to offsets in which the parties can trade 
interests in each others 401k, IRA, or other retirement funds then this provision can be modified 
accordingly, upon filing the appropriate written stipulation with the Court. 
11. Attorney Fees and Costs. Each party is to assume their own attorney fees with the 
provision that the Respondents attorney shall prepare the appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order necessary to divide the retirement plans. 
12. Guns. 
A. The Respondent is awarded the following guns: 
i. 1917 Springfield 30-06 Army Rifle. Bolt Action, sling with Weaver 4x scope. 
First gun Brad ever owned has had for 44 years. Priceless sentimental value. 
ii. 1948 JC Higgins 410 gauge Single Shot (not bolt action) shotgun. Was Brad's 
Fathers gun. Hand me down priceless sentimental value. 
iii. 1946 JC Higgins 16 gauge Single Shot (not bolt action) shotgun. Was Brad's 
fathers gun. Hand me down priceless sentimental value. 
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iv. New (approx. 2000) Remington Model 7400 30-06 Semi Auto Rifle, with sling 
and Redfield 3x9 scope. Also with (2) carrying cases and (1) hard case for 4-wheeler. Brad's 
priceless sentimental value. Less than 200 rounds fired. 
v. New (approx. 1992) AR-15 Assault Rifle. Never been shot. Fold away stock, 
with extra wood stock still in package. Brads priceless sentimental value. 
vi. New (approx. 1988 prior to marriage) Ruger 10-22 Semi Auto Rifle, with 3 clips, 
sling. Brads priceless sentimental value. 
vii. New (approx 1986 prior to marriage) Remington 12 gauge 2" Mag. Pump shot 
gun. Brads priceless sentimental value. 
viii. Ruger 22 Magnum Super Six pistol with Leopold 2x7x scope, (2) holsters, and 
carrying case. Brads priceless sentimental value. Was given to Brad as a gift from father-in-law 
(when he was still alive) and children. 
ix. Ruger Red Hawk 44 Cal Mag. Pistol with holster and gun case. Brads priceless 
sentimental value. Was given to Brad while father-in-law was still alive as a gift from Marian and 
children. 
x. Smith & Wesson 45 Cal Model 25 pistol. Brads priceless sentimental value. Was 
given to Brad as a gift from father-in-laws collection from Marian and children. 
xi. (4) new (2005) High Point 9 mm Pistols Model C-9. All 4 pistols brand new, 
never been shot. 
xii. Ruger 357 cal revolver. Was purchased from father-in-laws' collection after 
death. (Never been shot) 
xiii. Misc. Supplies: 2 soft case rifle holders, 2 nylon pistol holsters, 2 soft shot gun 
holders, 1 antique leather gun holder from father (priceless sentimental value), all cleaning supplies 
and complete cleaning kits for all guns. 
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ivx. (1) gun safe full of ammunition, approx. 10 bricks of 22 long rifle bullets, 
approx. (500) 22-mag cal bullets, approx. (200) 44 cal bullets, approx. (100_ 45 cal bullets, approx. 
10 boxes total 12 gauge, 16 gauge, and 4-10 gauge shot gun shells. 
B. The Petitioner is awarded the following guns: 
i. Savage 12 gauge shot gun pump. Purchased from father-in-laws' collection after 
his death. 
death. 
ii. Savage 12 gauge shot gun pump. Purchased from father-in-laws' collection after 
iii. (2) each Derringer small 22 cal pistols (collectors items) purchased from father-
in-laws' collection after death. 
iv. Smith & Wesson 38 cal short barrel revolver. Purchased from father-in-laws' 
collection after death. 
v. Smith & Wesson 357 cal revolver, short barrel. Purchased from father-in-laws' 
collection after death. 
vi. Savage 30-06 rifle bolt action. To member of family from father-in-laws' 
collection after death. 
vii. Remington 22 cal rifle single shot bolt action with sling (black plastic stock). 
To member of family from father-in-laws' collection after death. 
viii. Remington 22 cal rifle single shot bolt action. To member of family from 
father-in-laws' collection after death. 
ix. Remington 12 gauge pump shot gun. To member of family from father-in-laws' 
collection after death. 
C. The Court is cognizant that the Petitioner has testified that she disposed of all 
the guns. However, in the event the Petitioner is able to re-obtain possession of Respondents' guns 
and deliver them to the Respondent in a condition acceptable to the Respondent, then the value of 
said guns may be offset against the monetary judgment awarded above. If the parties cannot agree 
upon the value then the matter shall be submitted to the Court on a post trial motion submitted by 
either party and the4 Court shall determine the value. 
13. Monetary Judgment. The Respondent is awarded a monetary judgment against the 
Petitioner in the sum of $1,083.00, to be collected from the Petitioners' portion of the proceeds of 
the home sale subject to the provision set forth below. 
14. Personal Property - Household Goods. With regards to the remainder of the parties 
personal properties, including household goods and supplies the Court orders them to be divided as 
follows: 
The Respondent shall prepare two (2) lists of approximately equal value. After compiling 
the lists the Respondent shall forward the two (2) lists to Petitioners' attorney. Petitioners' attorney 
shall identify the list which the Petitioner desires. Those items the list chosen by the Petitioner shall 
be awarded to her, and the remainder of the items on the other list shall be awarded to the 
Respondent. Any property on the list not in the possession of the parties shall be immediately 
forwarded to the other parties. The Court expects the parties to cooperate fully in the exchange of 
the items. Each party is responsible for any costs or transportation from their currently location to 
the other party. 
A. Property awarded to Petitioner: Petitioner is awarded the property on the 
attached list identified as Group B and the following personal property: 
Misc. Jewelry, Rings, Necklaces Wedding Ring 
Oak Quilting Frames Serger Sewing Machine 
Embroiderer Sewing Machine Singer Sewing Machine 
All Quilting Supplies Oak Curio Hutch 
(2) Antique Chest of Drawers Family Records/Book of Remembrance 
Chest Freezer (previous marriage) Oak Round Table 
Various Church Books Temple Clothing 
All Personal Clothing Winter Coats, Hats, Boots 
Personal Pictures Mis. Ofc. Supplies, Books, Folders 
Camping Gear, Tents 
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B. Property awarded to Respondent: Respondent is awarded the property on th| 
attached list identified as Group A and the following personal property: 
Misc. Rings 
Dutro Camp Stove 
Eagle Sculpture 
(2) Mexican Cloth Paintings w/Frames 
Mothers Hand Me Downs 
Family Records/Book of Remembrance 
Temple Clothing 
Winter Coats, Hats, Boots 
Running Equip./Knee Braces 
Wedding Ring 
Large Eagle Winter Painting 
Misc. Fishing Pictures 
Antique Typewriter 
Grandmothers Hand Me Downs 
Various Church Books 
All Personal Clothing 
Running Clothes/Shoes 
Personal Pictures 
Pictures of Brad & Children/Grandchildren Misc. Const. Books/Manuals 
Computer Manuals Woodworking Construction Books 
Maps, Topo Maps, Fishing Maps Rain Coats, Fishing Hats 
Mountain Bike Books, Supplies Personal Belongings in Gun Safes 
Personal Papers in File Cabinets 
15. Alimony. The Court orders the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner as and fo| 
alimony the sum of $1,000.00, per month beginning 30 days from the date of closing from the sale 
of the home in Nibley, Utah. Alimony shall continue for the period of eighteen (18) years beginning 
July 1, 2008. The Court orders that the Respondent shall be given credit for the payments, so loni 
as the Petitioner is continuing to reside in the home. Alimony shall terminate as provided by statute 
upon the Petitioners' remarriage, cohabitation, or death, or the death of the Respondent. 
16. Division of Debt-LKL and Capitol Building Supply Debt. The Petitioner is orderel 
to assume the indebtedness to LKL Associates, and the Respondent is ordered to assume the 
indebtedness to Capital Building Supply. Each party is ordered to hold the other harmless from any 
claim by the respective creditor against the other party. 
17. Notice to Creditors: Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-4-6.5, 30-2-5, and 30-3 
5(l)(c) (1953 as amended), the parties are required to provide a copy of their final Decree of Divorc^ 
to all joint creditors for any outstanding obligations that are included in their Decree of Divorce 
Therefore the party not obligated to pay a joint obligation shall: 
a. Send a copy of the Decree of Divorce to each creditor he/she is not required to pajf 
as soon as possible; 
b. Notify the joint creditor of the current address for each party; 
[arris, Preston 
: Chambers, P.C. 
1 Federal Avenue 
-ogan, Utah 84321 
135) 752-3551 
c. Inform that joint creditor that each party is entitled to receive individual 
statements, notices and correspondence required by law or by the terms of the contract and also 
inform the creditor that no negative credit report or other exchange of credit history or repayment 
practices may be made regarding the joint obligation because of non-payment by the party required 
to pay the debt unless the creditor has first made a demand for payment on the party who is not 
required to pay the debt. 
Dated this^day of July, 2008. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce, 
postage prepaid, to Petitioner's attorney, Kenyon D. Dove, Smith Knowles, 4723 Harrison Blvd., 
Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84403, dated this / / day . 
F:\jmc\0\OIson, Brad\Divorce\corrected decree of divorce.Revised aft hearing 20O8.O6.30.wpd 
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HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
Attorney for Respondent 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 752-3551 
Facsimile: (435) 752-3556 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN C. OLSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRADLEY L. OLSON, 
Respondent. 
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* 
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* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 054100358 
Judge Clint Judkins 
This matter came for trial on February 6 and 7,2008 and oral argument on February 28,2008, 
before the District Court, the Honorable Clint S. Judkins, District Judge presiding. The Petitioner 
was present and represented by her attorneys, Kenyon D. Dove and M. Darin Hammond, Smith 
Knowles, P.C, Ogden, Utah. The Respondent was present and represented by his attorney Joseph 
M. Chambers, Harris, Preston & Chambers, P.C, Logan, Utah. Having considered the evidence and 
arguments of counsel and having rendered its decision from the bench on Wednesday, April 16, 
2008, the Court now enters its formal Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Date of Marriage and Other Dates. The parties were married in Smithfield, Utah on 
November 18, 1989. No issue were born to the parties. This is a second marriage for both parties. 
Both parties are currently 54 years old and in good physical health. The parties have been married 
for 18+ years, but have been living separately since December 2004. The Petitioner resides in 
Nibley, Utah. The Respondent currently lives in Las Vegas, Nevada and moved there for purposes 
of obtaining employment in June 2006. 
ENT'D JUL 2 1 2008 
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2. Employment at Time of Marriage. At the time of their marriage, the Petitioner (wife) 
had been employed at Utah State University ("USU") for approximately 18 months. She began her 
employment at USU on May 1, 1988. At the time the parties married, the Respondent (husband) 
owned and operated a drywall and acoustical business as a sole proprietor. Respondent (husband) 
had just purchased his partner, Brad Johnson's interest, in their drywall partnership business prior 
to the marriage. 
3. Smithfield Home. At the time of the parties marriage, Wife owned a home in 
Smithfield, Utah which she and her prior husband had acquired 11 years earlier. After the marriage 
the parties lived in the Smithfield home for nine (9) years, during which time both parties contributed 
to the mortgage payments and maintenance of the home. Husband testified that he also contributed 
improvements to the Smithfield residence in the form of finishing basement rooms and other 
construction iabor and materials, which he estimated, based on his construction experience, 
exclusive of his labor to be approximately $6-8,000.00. Husband further testified that materials that 
were purchased for the improvements to the Smithfield home were run through and "expensed off 
through the drywall business, B & B Drywall, Inc. 
4. B & B Drywall Incorporation. After the parties were married, husband incorporated 
his drywall and acoustical business. Following incorporation, the husband and wife were equal 
(50%/50%) shareholders, were both directors, as well as officers of the corporation and each drew 
a salary from the corporation. Husband acted as the corporation's president and secretary, and the 
wife acted as the corporation's vice-president. 
5. Husband's Experience in Construction. At the time of the trial, the Husband testified 
he had been in the drywall business for approximately 31 years. 
6. Nibley Home. In November 1996, the parties acquired a building lot in Nibley, Utah. 
The lot was acquired in the parties' joint names. [Petitioner's Ex. #1, tab 27] The building lot was 
purchased for $48,500.00 and was purchased with B & B Drywall, Inc., funds. During late 1997 and 
early 1998 the parties constructed a home on the lot in Nibley, Utah. The Nibley residence is 
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approximately 6,000 square feet and lies on the west bank of the Blacksmith Fork River in Nibley, 
Utah. The home is completely finished (sheet rocked and painted throughout) including the 
basement. The 6,000 square foot home was constructed partially with a $125,000.00 construction 
loan from Cache Valley Bank, which the parties obtained in November 1997. [Petitioner's Ex. #/, 
tab 3] Husband testified that a significant amount of the building materials (lumber, dry wall, wiring, 
etc.) used to build the home was purchased by B & B Drywall, Inc., and "expensed off by the 
corporation; that labor from B & B employees, was used in the construction of the home; that trades 
(primarily labor) were made by B & B with other subcontractors (electrical, foundation, framing, 
etc.) which benefitted the parties personally, and which the parties never reimbursed B & B Drywall. 
Husband also testified that the $ 125,000.00 construction loan was used primarily for the acquisition 
of building materials and that primarily B & B was traded labor with other subcontractors. 
7. Nibley Shop. In addition to the Nibley home, the parties constructed a large shop 
adjacent to the home. Husband testified that the shop was built at a cost of approximately 
$75,000.00. Husband testified that the materials and labor for the shop also came from B & B 
Drywall, Inc. The shop is entirely finished - sheet rocked and painted - and has balconies at both the 
east and west ends of the shop. After the shop was built it was used primarily to store B & B 
equipment and supplies as well as some of the parties' personal property, including the Husband's 
woodworking equipment which was also purchased with B & B funds. 
8. Premarital Interest. In July 1998, Wife sold the Smithfield home where the parties 
jointly resided after their marriage and received proceeds from the sale of approximately 
$118,000.00. Wife deposited the money from the sale of the Smithfield property into a joint 
checking account owned by the wife and the husband. Wife provided evidence that shortly after the 
deposit of the money, $94,320.00 of the funds were utilized to pay off then balance of the Cache 
Valley Bank construction loan. The Court finds that $108,000.00 of the approximate $118,000.00 
constitutes Wife's pre-marital property interest in the parties' Nibley home. 
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9. Appreciation of Premarital Interest. The Court finds that the Petitioner should also 
receive a credit for the increase in her pre-marital interest ($108,000.00) in the Nibley property. 
Assuming a five (5%) percent annual increase over the past ten (10) years this would result in a 
credit of approximately $54,000.00. 
10. Equipment in Nobly Shop. The Court finds from a preponderance of the evidence 
that Petitioner had control over and cannot account for substantial property stored in the Nibley shop 
including the B & B equipment and other property as evidenced by the photographs taken by Terry 
Oliver, a loan officer for Cache Valley Bank, all the parties guns, as well as the money in the two 
(2) safes. Petitioner testified she has disposed of all of the guns, including Respondent's guns. 
11. Offset of Premarital Interest. Because of the Petitioner's actions set forth in 
Paragraph 10 the Court finds that it is equitable to effect a wash or offset as to the $54,000.00 credit, 
and instead awards all of the property in the Nibley shop, the money in the safe, and the guns 
(subject to further provisions below) to the Petitioner. 
12. Value of Nibley Home. The Court finds the value of the home to be $550,000.00. 
Testimony of the appraiser Dustin Singleton, who appraised the home as of November 30, 2005, 
valued the home at approxi-mately $480,000.00 subject to certain repairs. Mr. Singleton further 
testified that during 2006 and 2007 there was general appreciation in real estate in Cache Valley of 
between 5%- 10% annually. The Court finds that would equate to approximately $76,000.00, of 
additional value. However, given the current real estate market, the Court finds the value of the 
home to be $550,000.00. 
13. Equitable Division of Nibley Home. The Court finds it is equitable to order the home 
to be sold with the proceeds to be paid as follows: 
First: Those expenses necessary to put the home in a saleable position, i.e., to repair the 
foundation leak which the Court anticipates would be no more than approximately $25,000.00; the 
evidence of the cost of repairs was less than concrete and by requiring each party to participate in 
the repairs each party benefits by having the repairs effected in the most economic fashion. 
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Second: The costs of sale, i.e., real estate commissions, title insurance, which the Court 
anticipates would be approximately $33,000.00; 
Third: The sum of $108,000.00, to the Petitioner representing her premarital interest as 
found previously by the Court; 
Fourth: That sum necessary to pay the balance of the Cache Valley Bank ("CVB") such 
amount necessary to pay the balance of the C VB debt plus accruing interest and costs, approximately 
$326,328.00; and 
Fifth: The balance, if any, to be divided one-half (V2) to the Petitioner and one-half (lA) to 
the Respondent which the Court anticipates would be approximately $30,000.00, each. This would 
leave the Petitioner with approximately $ 138,000.00, and the Respondent with $30,000.00, from the 
sale of the home. 
14. Timeshare. In March 2001, the parties purchased a timeshare from Worldmark 
(formely Trendwest Resorts) for $ 10,440.00. Husband testified that from the date of purchase until 
he left the marital residence in December, 2004 that B & B Dry wall, Inc., paid the installment 
payments and quarterly dues on the timeshare. The purchase contract lists the parties and B & B 
Drywall, Inc., as the purchaser of the timeshare interest. [Respondents Ex. #1, tab 8] The Court 
finds that the Petitioner has had exclusive possession, control, benefit, and use of the same since 
their separation in December 2004. The Court finds the value of the timeshare to be $6,500.00 and 
the Court awards it to the Petitioner as her sole and separate property, she also being solely 
responsible for any and all debt or maintenance on such. 
15. Knowledge of Co-mingling of Business and Personal Accounts. Wife claimed that 
she was unaware that the family business (B & B Drywall, Inc.) had been used to pay for the 
construction of the home, the shop, home furnishings, personal woodworking tools, the timeshare, 
their personal living expenses and/or other non-business expenditures. However, she was an officer, 
director and shareholder of the company since its incorporation and she testified that as vice-
president part of her job duties included balancing the bank statements. David Saunders, the B & 
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B Dry wall, Inc., company accountant, testified that wife gave him instructions not to reconcile the 
bank statements because she had already done that. During the process of reconciling the bank 
statements she would have had an opportunity to see exactly what the company checks were being 
written for. Furthermore Wife also admitted during cross-examination that in her deposition she 
testified that she was aware that the company had purchased personal items such as a treadmill, golf 
clubs, and other items without claiming the items as income from the corporation. Husband testified 
that it was not uncommon for them to utilize the B & B checking account to purchase personal goods 
as well as to place personal items on the company credit card and then pay off the company credit 
card using a company check. According to husband's testimony, these items included the timeshare, 
materials for the Nibley home, home furnishings such as couches, personal woodworking 
equipment, a pool table, and other furnishings and fixtures. The Court finds that both the parties 
knew they were using B & B Dry wall funds for their personal use and benefit 
16. Cache Valley Bank Loans. Greg Miller, President of Cache Valley Bank, testified 
that with respect to the $250,000.00 loan to B & B Drywall that both parties participated in the 
initiation of the loan. The Court finds the total debt to Cache Valley Bank is approximately 
$326,328.00, plus accruing interest. While the loan documents are only signed by Brad Olson in his 
capacity as President of B & B Drywall, Inc., and as a personal guarantor of the loan, the Court notes 
that all of the loan proceeds were either disbursed to suppliers directly or into the B&B checking 
accounts over which both parties had control, and the Court is persuaded that because of the way in 
which the parties handled the corporation financial affairs and personally benefitted from the 
corporation assets that all of the business debt should be treated as marital debt. 
17. Co-mingling Found. The Court finds that the parties have co-mingled their personal 
and business financial affairs to a point that in order for this Court to make an equitable division of 
the marital property and debts, it is reasonable and equitable to treat all of the parties personal and 
business assets and business debts as marital debts and make an equitable division of the same. 
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18. Summary of Marital Property & Debts. The Court finds that the marital assets 
and debts consist of the following: 
Olson v. Olson 05-4100358 
Assets: 
Home 
Less approximate cost to repair 
Less R/E Comm. & Title 
Less Premarital Interest 
Less Cache Valley Bank debt 
Net Value to be divided !4 to each 
Personal Property per Lists: 
Timeshare 
Equipment in Nibley shop 
Equipment in Hyrum shed 
Personal property per list attached 
B & B Drywall, Inc., a Utah corp. 
Coin collection 
Cash in attic safe 
cash in basement safe 
2001 Ford Expedition 
Brad Olson's 401k/retirements 
North Track Invest. 
Janus funds 
MB 401k 
Mariam's 401 k/retirements 
AGI Valic 
URS401k 
North Track Invest. 
USU/USR annuity 
Debts: 
Attorney fees 
Cache Valley Bank 
LKL judgment 
LWL (Capital Builders) judgment 
Subtotal debt: 
Value 
$550,000.00 
(25,000.00) 
(33,000.00) 
(108,000.00) 
(326,328.00) 
$57,672.00 
6,500.00 
to Petitioner 
21,000.00 
0.00 
15,000.00 
to Petitioner 
to Petitioner 
10,000.00 
4192.00 
63,202.00 
15,891.00 
as an offset 
as an offset 
as an offset 
Resp. Ex. 1 Tab. 10 
Resp. Ex. 1 Tab 10 
Resp. Ex. 1 Tab 10 
53,768.00 
52,747.00 
7,444.00 
Value Not Determ. 
Each takes their own 
(326,328.00) 
(40,985.00) 
(61,774.00) 
(429,087.00) 
Resp. Ex. 1 Tab 10 
REx. 1 Tab 10 P Ex. 43 
Pet. Ex. 42 
Resp. Ex. 43 
[arris, Preston 
i Chambers, P.C. 
1 Federal Avenue 
,ogan, Utah 84321 
135) 752-3551 
19. Woodward Division of Retirement Accounts. The Court finds it is equitable to 
divide the retirements pursuant to the Woodward Formula. 
20. Vehicles. The Court determines the value of the 2001 Ford Expedition to be 
$10,000.00 and awards it to the Petitioner. The Court determines the value of the 1989 Ford 
Truck, which was impounded and sold, to be $500.00, and awards it to the Respondent. 
21. Coin Collection. The Court determines the value of the coin collection, consisting of 
the items set forth below and all ancillary supplies and equipment to be $15,000.00, and finds it 
equitable to award that to the Respondent, including all items currently in the Petitioners possession 
or control. The Court finds the Coin Collection consists of the following: 
Any and all supplies associated with coin collecting 
New microscope for coins 
Coin paper, plastic, and box holders 
Paper coin holders and stapler for holders 
Coin computer software 
Coin books and brochures 
Coin desk lamp / magnifying glass 
Paper money collection and collectables 
US Quarter & Stamp Collection and Binder 
Misc. coins and collectables left in Factory Safe 
22. Equipment in Hyrum Storage Shed. The Court finds the value of the tools and 
[equipment in the Hyrum storage shed to be $21,000.00, and that it is equitable to award that to the 
Respondent subject to the lien of Cache Valley Bank, which should be satisfied by the proceeds 
Ifrom the sale of the home. 
23. Marital Debts and Equitable Division Thereof. The Court finds the debts of the 
[marriage consists of the following: 
Cache Valley Bank $326,328.00 
Capitol Building Supply $ 61,774.00 
LKL Associates $ 40,965.00 
The Court has already dealt with the Cache Valley Bank debt as provided above, to be 
[satisfied out of the proceeds from the sale of the home. The Court finds it is equitable for the 
Respondent to assume the Capitol Building Supply debt and the Petitioner to assume the LKL 
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Associates debt, and that each party should be ordered to hold the other harmless from any claim 
by the respective creditor. 
24. Remaining Personal Property and Household Goods. With regards to the remaining 
personal property, the Court finds it is equitable for the Respondent to make two (2) lists of 
approximate equal value and that the Petitioner shall then have her first choice of the two (2) lists. 
25. Guns. The Court finds it equitable to award the guns as follows: 
A. Petitioner: All guns on the Respondents' list submitted to the Court identifying 
the guns as Marian's guns or joint ownership, which consists of the following: [ 
i. Savage 12 gauge shot gun pump. Purchased from father-in-laws' collection after 
his death. 
ii. Savage 12 gauge shot gun pump. Purchased from father-in-laws' collection after 
ideath. 
iii. (2) each Derringer small 22 cal pistols (collectors items) purchased from father-in-
laws' collection after death. 
iv. Smith & Wesson 38 cal short barrel revolver. Purchased from father-in-laws' 
[collection after death. 
v. Smith & Wesson 357 cal revolver, short barrel. Purchased from father-in-laws' 
(collection after death. 
vi. Savage 30-06 rifle bolt action. To member of family from father-in-laws' 
[collection after death. 
vii. Remington 22 cal rifle single shot bolt action with sling (black plastic stock). 
|To member of family from father-in-laws' collection after death. 
viii. Remington 22 cal rifle single shot bolt action. To member of family from father-
Hn-laws' collection after death. 
ix. Remington 12 gauge pump shot gun. To member of family from father-in-laws' 
(collection after death. 
B. Respondent: All guns on the list identified as Brads guns which consists of the 
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following: 
i. 1917 Springfield 30-06 Army Rifle. Bolt Action, sling with Weaver 4x scope. First 
gun Brad ever owned has had for 44 years. Priceless sentimental value. 
ii. 1948 JC Higgins 410 gauge Single Shot (not bolt action) shotgun. Was Brad's 
Fathers gun. Hand me down priceless sentimental value. 
iii. 1946 JC Higgins 16 gauge Single Shot (not bolt action) shotgun. Was Brad's 
fathers gun. Hand me down priceless sentimental value. 
iv. New (approx. 2000) Remington Model 7400 30-06 Semi Auto Rifle, with sling 
and Redfield 3x9 scope. Also with (2) carrying cases and (1) hard case for 4-wheeler. Brad's 
priceless sentimental value. Less than 200 rounds fired. 
v. New (approx. 1992) AR-15 Assault Rifle. Never been shot. Fold away stock, with 
jextra wood stock still in package. Brads priceless sentimental value. 
vi. New (approx. 1988 prior to marriage) Ruger 10-22 Semi Auto Rifle, with 3 clips, 
sling. Brads priceless sentimental value. 
vii. New (approx 1986 prior to marriage) Remington 12 gauge 2M Mag. Pump shot 
|gun. Brads priceless sentimental value. 
viii. Ruger 22 Magnum Super Six pistol with Leopold 2x7x scope, (2) holsters, and 
[carrying case. Brads priceless sentimental value. Was given to Brad as a gift from father-in-law 
|(when he was still alive) and children. 
ix. Ruger Red Hawk 44 Cal Mag. Pistol with holster and gun case. Brads priceless 
(sentimental value. Was given to Brad while father-in-law was still alive as a gift from Marian and 
(children. 
x. Smith & Wesson 45 Cal Model 25 pistol. Brads priceless sentimental value. Was 
^iven to Brad as a gift from father-in-laws collection from Marian and children. 
xi. (4) new (2005) High Point 9 mm Pistols Model C-9. All 4 pistols brand new, 
(never been shot. 
xii. Ruger 357 cal revolver. Was purchased from father-in-laws' collection after 
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death. (Never been shot) 
xiii. Misc. Supplies: 2 soft case rifle holders, 2 nylon pistol holsters, 2 soft shot gun 
holders, 1 antique leather gun holder from father (priceless sentimental value), all cleaning supplies 
and complete cleaning kits for all guns. 
ivx. (1) gun safe full of ammunition, approx. 10 bricks of 22 long rifle bullets, 
approx. (500) 22-mag cal bullets, approx. (200) 44 cal bullets, approx. (100_ 45 cal bullets, approx. 
10 boxes total 12 gauge, 16 gauge, and 4-10 gauge shot gun shells. 
Again the Court is taking into consideration that it is not awarding any increase in the 
premarital interest in the home, however, the Petitioner has testified that all of the guns have been 
disposed of (testimony which the Court did not find credible) and hence the Respondent's guns may 
not be capable of delivery to the Respondent.. 
26. Amount to Equalize Division of Assets and Debts. The Court finds that the 
Respondent has been given more debt to assume and in order to equalize the property and debt 
division it is equitable to award a judgment in favor of the Respondent against the Petitioner in the 
amount of $5,275.00, to equalize the parties. 
27. Adjustment for Accounts. However, despite the award outlined above, the Court finds 
jthat the Respondent has disposed of Cache Investment Club $6,108.00, and Ameritrade $2,277.00, 
(total $8,385.00) one-half or $4,192.00, of which the Petitioner should receive credit towards the 
$5,275.00. ($5,275.00 - $4,192.00 = $1,083.00). The net amount the Petitioner owes to Respondent 
is $1,083.00, which shall be taken out of the proceeds from the sale of the home. 
28. Award of Judgment Against Petitioner. However, if the Petitioner can reclaim any of 
[the Respondent's guns she claims to have sold the value of those guns, if delivered to the Respondent 
in the same condition when she took control of the same shall be applied to the $1,083.00, amount 
Ishe owes to the Respondent. If the parties' cannot come to an agreement as to the value of the 
(returned guns the parties' may ask the Court to assign a value to the returned guns. 
29. Wife's income & employment: The Court finds from the evidence that the wife is 54 
(years old and in good physical and mental health. She is not a college graduate but is employed at 
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Utah State University in the HR-Personnel Office and is responsible for working with employee 
benefits. She has been employed at USU for over 19 years. During the marriage wife also took a 
salary from B & B Dry wall, Inc., ranging between $ 15,000.00 and $ 18,000.00 per year. [Respondent's 
Ex 1, tab 1] Because B & B is insolvent, and no longer in business, the Court does not believe the 
imputation of income from this source, is proper. Wife has testified that her current supervisor has 
made a college degree a requirement of employment in her current position, however, the Court feels 
it is unlikely that after 19 years of steady, full-time employment at this state institution, that she is in 
|jeopardy of losing her employment. She may need to transfer to another position but the reduction 
of her income is not likely. At present she earns $47,610.00 annually ($3,967.50 per month) 
[Petitioner's Ex..#l, tab 41] and she has testified she receives a cost of living increase annually in 
July of each year. The Court notes that Wife has had sufficient income to add to her 401k retirement 
monthly. 
From the property settlement, Wife will receive approximately $138,000.00, to put down on 
a new home and assuming a modest home of $200,000.00, Wife would be required to finance $60 -
70,000.00 of that amount. Wife did not put into evidence her 2005 or 2006 income tax returns and 
so the Court is not aware of whether the withholdings result in a refund, however her current Federal 
& State withholdings are $379.33 and $207.05 respectively, and $298.76 for FICA for a total of 
$885.14 in tax deductions or 22.31% ($885.14/$3,967.50). As of December 1, 2007 wife had 265 
hours of accrued annual leave (33 days) and 367 hours of accrued sick leave (46 days). Wife's 
[current monthly payroll deductions are $991.00 per month leaving her a net monthly income of 
|$2,977.00. 
30. Wife's budget and needs: Shortly after the divorce was filed in August of 2005, the 
[parties appeared before Commissioner Garner for a hearing on temporary orders. Wife presented a 
budget at that time indicating her needs were $3,095.00 per month (inclusive of food/household 
supplies of $450.00 per month; $500.00 per month in legal fees and $200.00 for college courses). 
{Respondent's Ex #/, tab 4] At trial Wife submitted a budget totaling $6,210.29 per month 
^inclusive of $1,000.00 per month for legal fees and $2,500.00 per month for a mortgage or lease 
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payment). The Court has considered that the Petitioner will receive approximately $ 13 8,000.00 from 
the sale of the Nibley residence and if she reinvests that into a modest home in the $200,000.00, range 
that her mortgage payment would be around $600.00 - $700.00. The Court is also aware that at some 
point she will need to replace her vehicle. The Court finds that the Wife needs would be 
approximately $4,200.00, per month and that her net needs are approximately $1,000.00, per month 
short. 
31. Husband's income and employment: The Court finds from the evidence that the 
Husband is 54 years old and is not a college graduate. Husband is in good physical health, however, 
husband has experienced severe depression and twice in late 2004 voluntarily admitted himself to a 
[health care facility for assistance due to the manifestations of his depression. At present Husband is 
under the care of a physician and takes antidepressants, which have allowed him to function more 
productively, (This Court is also aware of the depression and suicide incidents in the Husband's 
medical history as it was the primary reason this Court issued the protective order in late 2005.) 
Husband has been involved in the construction and dry wall business for 31 years. In August 
lof 2005 the wife and husband stipulated to the appointment of a court appointed receiver with respect 
p B & B Drywall, Inc., where the husband had been employed since before the marriage. He had 
been drawing a salary of approximately $36-37,000.00 annually until 2005 when the business failed. 
[The Court notes that based on both parties testimony there were substantial personal expenses and 
pther draws from the business and believes the parties' income from the business as reflected on the 
pcome tax return is not really indicative of either parties' historical earning potential prior to the 
[business failure. 
After the receiver was appointed (August 2005) Husband eventually found employment with 
[Valley Drywall (a drywall business in Cache Valley) at $15-16.00 per hour. In June 2006 Husband 
relocated to Las Vegas, Nevada to take a new job, at an annual salary $65,000.00/year with M & H 
Building Specialties, as an assistant drywall estimator. Approximately three (3) months after he 
began working for M & H, his supervisor, the senior estimator, died and Husband was required to 
take on both his and his former supervisor's job responsibilities. In 2007 Husband worked 3,365 
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hours to meet the job demands of both his job and that of his former supervisor. Husband testified 
[that his workload demands were unusually high due not only to the significant demand for building 
Iconstruction in the Las Vegas area but also because of his supervisor's untimely death. Because of 
his increased job responsibilities and the substantial overtime required by the Husband's employer, 
husband received a salary increase in 2007 to $94,059.00 annual salary and a special discretionary 
bonus of $46,416.00. Husband's current salary is $1,850.00 per week or $96,200.00 annually. He 
has the potential for additional bonuses; however these bonuses are totally discretionary with the 
[owners of the company and such bonuses have historically been based on the company's overall 
(performance, not individual performance. 
Husband testified that he has asked his employer to hire another estimator as he cannot 
(maintain the same level of stress that he did in 2007 or he would find other employment. At present 
[the Husband is working hours closer to the normal 40 hour work week. The Court is persuaded that 
given Husband's medical condition as well as the general economic condition of the construction 
industry slow down nationwide, that it is unlikely that husband would maintain the same level of 
(hours at work that he did in 2007 or the corresponding compensation. 
In addition the Court notes that a B & B Drywall supplier, Capital Building Supply, has 
[obtained a $61,000.00 personal judgment against Husband and is currently garnishing husband's 
paycheck. Capital garnished approximately $ 18,200.00 in 2007 and is entitled under Nevada law to 
pke 25% of husband's disposable income. It is likely that the husband will continue to have another 
^18,000.00-$23,000.00 garnished in 2008. 
For purposes of calculating a reasonable income based on a 40/50 hour work week, the Court 
[will utilize the base salary of $96,200.00, less the $18,200.00 garnishment, and a reasonable 
allowance for state, federal and FICA taxes of 27 percent ($25,974.00). The Court finds the 
husband's 2008 disposable income is $52,226.00 annually or $4,352.00 per month. For purposes 
pf setting alimony the Court finds the Husband's monthly available income of $6,000.00, per month 
prior to any bonuses which bonuses the Court understands and finds is discretionary with the 
employer. 
irris, Preston 
Chambers, P.C. 
Federal Avenue 
gan, Utah 84321 
55) 752-3551 
32. Husband's Budget and Needs: Husband submitted a monthly budget of $7,991.00 per 
month (inclusive of $ 1,514.00 per month garnishments). The Court finds that the cost of living and 
living expenses in general in the Las Vegas area are greater than similar living expenses in Logan, 
Utah. The Court accepts the Husband's budget as reasonable in the amount of $6,800.00, per month. 
33. Alimony Findings and Award. The Court finds that it is equitable to order alimony 
to be paid by Respondent/Husband to the Petitioner/Wife in the sum of $1,000.00, per month, to be 
paid beginning 30 days after closing on the home and continue per the state statute for a period of no 
more than 18 years from the date of July 1, 2008, unless otherwise terminated by co-habitation, 
remarriage, or death of the Petitioner or the death of the Respondent. The Court has considered the 
alimony factors set forth in §30-3-5(8)(a) U.C.A., including the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; the recipient earning capacity; the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; the 
length of marriage; whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouses skill; fault; the parties standard of living at separation. As to fault the Court finds the 
[evidence is not sufficient to merit further consideration of that factor. 
34. B & B Drywall Going Concern Value. The Court finds the parties Dry wall and 
[Acoustical business has no going concern value. 
35. Petitioner's Exclusive Possession of'Home. The Court finds that since December 
J2004, Wife has had the exclusive use of the home subject only to paying the real property taxes and 
[insurance while the Husband has been excluded from the property. 
36. Value of Equipment in Nibley Shop and Dominion over Equipment. Husband has 
[claimed that Wife has also had the exclusive use of the household furnishings and the tools and 
Equipment that were stored in the Nibley shop which both husband and Mark Davis valued at 
approximately $96,000,00. These items were in the Nibley shop at the time he left the residence (and 
kvas later excluded from the residence by the Protective Order) and were stored in the shop built 
(adjacent to the Nibley home. 
37. Cache Valley Bank Inspection of Equipment. On August 3,2005, Cache Valley Bank 
through its loan officer Terry Oliver traveled to the Nibley property with Husband and obtained entry 
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to the shop and took photographs of the equipment in the shop. Upon entry to the shop, Husband told 
Mr. Oliver that substantial amounts of B & B equipment had been removed from the shop. He 
immediately provided a list of said equipment to Cache Valley Bank, who had a secured lien (UCC-1) 
on all of the B&B Drywall, Inc. equipment. The Court notes that Mr. Oliver's entry to the shop 
occurred before the appointment of a receiver. 
38. Ultimate Finding of Value of Equipment in Nibley Shop. Based on the testimony of 
Mark Davis, a former supervisor for B&B Drywall, Inc., who also had knowledge of what was in the 
shop on a regular basis, the Court finds that the Wife has had exclusive use and possession of the shop 
and the equipment since December of 2004. The Court declines to find a value of the equipment, but 
has instead treated it as an offset to allowing any increase to the Petitioners premarital interest in the 
Nibley home. 
39. Evidence of Existence of Equipment. The Court finds that as to those items of 
equipment which were still in the shop on August 3,2005, as evidenced by the photographs, wife has 
had exclusive use and possession of the same. Terry Oliver testified that the Bank has made demand 
on Wife for the equipment and the Bank has even filed a separate lawsuit to recover the equipment 
secured by its UCC lien, which case was also assigned to this Court for disposition 
40. Money in Safes. Husband testified that when he left the residence in December 2004 
the parties had $28,000.00 in an safe located in the attic of the Nibley home and $4,100.00 in a safe 
in the basement. Wife denied that these funds existed; however, during the hearing on temporary 
[orders before Commissioner Garner, Wife acknowledged that she removed from the attic safe a sum 
|of money, at least $20,500.00, and was ordered by Commissioner Garner to account for the money. 
Wife's accounting [Respondent's Ex. #1, tab 16] listed $5,000.00 as being used to pay off the 
iTrendwest timeshare. This accounting, however, is inconsistent with Petitioner's Ex. #1, tab 45, 
which shows monthly and quarterly payments on the timeshare after the time period Wife claims to 
have used a portion of the $20,500.00 to pay off the timeshare. In light of the Court's treatment of 
denying the Petitioner any increase in her premarital interest in the Nibley home, the Court believes 
it has disposed of all the parties' real and personal property. 
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41. Value of B & B. Dry wall. Inc., Stock,. The B & B Drywall business has no value as 
it is in a receivership and the business is insolvent, and the Court finds the value of the stock is 
worthless. 
42. Credibility of Petitioner. The Court finds the Petitioner's credibility was a concern 
to the Court, and in particular found her testimony to be less than credible with respect to disposition 
of the guns; the accounting for the money in the safe, and in particular the payoff of the Timeshare, 
as well as her claimed lack of any knowledge as to the business expenditures, which was inconsistent 
in light of the testimony that she reconciled the bank statements as part of her duties. 
43. Attorney Fees. The Court finds it equitable for each party to bear their own costs and 
attorney fees subject to the following provisions. Because Respondent did not timely respond to 
Petitioner's discovery and Petitioner was required to submit a Motion to Compel, the Court finds it 
equitable for the Respondent to be ordered to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Decree of Divorce, and any Qualified Domestic Relations Orders necessary to divide the retirement 
accounts as an offset to fees incurred by the Petitioner for filing the Motion to Compel. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The marriage between the parties should be terminated through entry of a Decree of 
Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The Petitioner has argued that the assets and 
debts of the marriage should be determined at the date of separation (December 2004) or the date of 
filing the divorce (August 2005). The Court determines that it should determine the assets and debts 
as of the date of trial February 2008. 
2. "[T]he primary purpose of a property division, in conjunction with an alimony award, 
is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties." Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, 
hf 27, 138 P.3d 84. The primary goal of this Court in any divorce proceeding is to accomplish an 
equitable division of the assets and debts of the parties. Divorce by its very nature is an equitable 
(proceeding. 
3. "Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity from its 
[stockholders. This is true whether the corporation has many stockholders or only one. Consequently, 
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the corporate veil which protects stockholders from individual liability will only be pierced reluctantly 
and cautiously." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782,786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quotations and citations 
omitted). To aid courts in deciding when to ignore th separate corporate existence, the Utah Supreme 
Court established a two-prong test in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 
(Utah 1979): "[I]n order to disregard the corporate entity, there must be a concurrence of two 
circumstances: (1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of 
one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow." Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Norman, 596 P.2d at 1030). 
Certain factors which are deemed significant, although not conclusive, in determining whether 
this test has been met include: (1) undercapitalization; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; 
(3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) 
nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the use 
of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 (footnotes omitted). 
4. Respondent has demonstrated the existence of the type of siphoning off of corporate 
funds by the dominant shareholders that the Court is satisfied there exists in this case the "unity of 
[interest" and "ownership" required by Norman. Respondent has testified that B & B Drywall, Inc., 
|(B&B) paid for the shareholders' personal expenses including improvements to the Smithfield home; 
B&B paid for the Nibley property on which their home and shop were later constructed; B&B paid 
[for materials for the Nibley home and shop; B&B its employees to work on the Nibley home and shop 
for which the shareholders did not reimburse the corporation; B&B made trades with other 
[subcontractors for labor as to the Nibley home and shop; B&B purchased and paid for the Trendwest 
pmeshare through 2004; B& owned and paid insurance and taxes on the parties' personal vehicles 
kvhich they drove (the Expedition and Ford truck); B&B paid for home furnishings; B&B paid for 
personal woodworking tools; and B&B even purchased personal goods and services on the company 
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credit cards which B & B Drywall later paid for. 
5. In addressing the Colman factors set forth above, the Court is satisfied that: (1) at the 
time the divorce was filed the corporation was insolvent and by stipulation of the parties was placed 
into a court-supervised receivership and was undercapitalized; (2) based on the Petitioner's own 
testimony they discussed matters almost daily but failed to observe the corporate formalities of 
holding shareholders' or directors' meetings; (3) there was no evidence of the payment of dividends 
and in fact the B & B corporate tax returns and other corporate financial records placed into evidence 
disclose no dividends were paid; (4) the parties knowingly and willfully siphoned off corporate funds 
to their own personal benefit; (5) other than the parties there were no other functioning officers or 
directors; (6) no evidence either way was produced as to the absence or existence of corporate records 
ant therefore finds this factor neutral; (7) the manner in which the parties used the corporation for 
their personal financial benefit as dominant shareholders would be a facade; and (8) use of the 
corporate entity or shell to obtain a financial benefit as to the assets but not the debt would promote 
an injustice. 6. Respondent has demonstrated that the strict observance of the 
corporation would lead to an inequitable result. For several years the parties have received 
substantial financial benefits from a corporation which they largely disregarded when it came to 
taking money from the corporation for their personal benefit; a corporation in which they are 
50%/50% or equal shareholders and are the only officers and directors of the corporation; a 
corporation they dominated for their own personal benefit. There has been such a co-mingling of the 
corporate funds with the marital assets acquired by the parties that it would be inequitable to treat the 
assets of the parties as marital assets and try to divide them equitably while disregarding the debts of 
[the corporation from which the parties directly received the financial benefit. 
7. The division of the real and personal property and the parties' debt as set forth above 
|accomplishes an equitable division of the marital property and debt. 
8. Awarding the Petitioner alimony in the amount of $ 1,000.00 per month beginning 30 
(days after the home is sold and continuing for a period of no more than eighteen (18) years from July 
1, 2008 unless otherwise terminated by statute by the co-habitation, remarriage of the Petitioner or 
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the death of either the Petitioner Respondent is just and equitable. 
9. Additionally, each of the parties individually should assume any debt incurred by them 
individually after the divorce was filed in August of 2005.J 
Dated this£(day of July, 2008. 
Q 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to Petitioner's attorney, Kenyon Dove, Smith Knowles, 4723 
Harrison Blvd., Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84403, dated this %? day of July, 2008. 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN C. OLSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRADLEY L. OLSON, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 054100358 
Judge: Larry E. Jones 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the court pursuant to Petitioner Marian C. Olson's Second 
Motion For Reassignment To A New Judge. The case was originally assigned to Judge Clint S. 
Judkins of the First District Court, who heard and ruled on the matter at trial. After the trial, 
Petitioner sought to disqualify Judge Judkins under Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Judge Judkins subsequently recused himself. On October 1,2008, the case was transferred to Judge 
Thomas L. Willmore. On October 29,2008, Petitioner filed the motion now before the court, seeking 
to disqualify Judge Willmore and transfer the case to a new judge. A notice to submit the matter for 
decision was filed on December 9, 2008. On January 7, 2009, Judge Willmore certified the motion 
for ieview to Judge Larry E. Jones. See Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(2). In preparation of its dec^ia^'iiie-
court has reviewed Petitioner's Motion and Memorandum in Support, Respondent Bradley L. 
Olson's Objection, Petitioner's Reply in Support, and the applicable case law and statutory 
provisions. Having considered the foregoing, the court issues this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
In accordance with Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a party ... may file a 
motion to disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is 
filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts "sufficient to show bias, 
prejudice or conflict of interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(A). However, said motion shall only be 
granted if "the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 63(b)(3)(A). Furthermore, the bias or prejudice set forth in the affidavit must "have some 
basis in fact and be grounded on more than mere conjecture and speculation." Madsen v. Prudential 
1 
Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538,544 n.5 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). Finally, as set forth in Treff 
v. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, \ 10, 26 P.3d 212, 215 (Utah 2001), an "allegation that is based on 
religious affiliation alone or that pertains to allegations of bias in unrelated contexts is not sufficient" 
to show bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest. ld.\ see also Utah R. Civ. P. 63. 
In her motion currently before the court, Petitioner claims to have discovered grounds 
requiring the disqualification of Judge Willmore. She argues that on Sunday, October 12, 2008, the 
local newspaper printed a marriage announcement which indicated that Judge Willmore had presided 
at a marriage ceremony held on September 20, 2008, for a bride and groom who have connections 
with this case. The groom is counsel for Cache County Bank, Jonathan Thomas, and the bride is the 
daughter of counsel for Respondent, Joe Chambers. Petitioner claims that Jonathan Thomas has 
attended hearings relating to this case and that Cache Valley Bank has a financial interest in the 
outcome of the case as a significant creditor of Respondent, who is also attempting to collect from 
Petitioner. Petitioner bases her claim of bias, prejudice, and conflict of interest on-Judicial Canon 
3 .E(l), which states that a "judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned...." In sum, Petitioner argues that pursuant to Rule 63, 
sufficient bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest exists, given Judge Willmore's apparent personal 
relationship with Respondent's counsel and counsel for Cache Valley Bank, to mandate the 
disqualification of Judge Willmore as his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 
In responser.Respondent argues that thereisno basis for disqualification of Judge WiUmoje: 
and that the affidavit and memorandum submitted by Petitioner contain only conjecture and baseless 
opinion. Respondent asserts that Respondent's motion and supporting affidavit are factually and 
legally insufficient and do not set forth an adequate basis for recusal. Respondent also notes that 
Judge Willmore has stated on the record that he has not had any discussions with any of the parties 
or their attorneys relative to this case prior to or subsequent to Judge Judkins' recusal from the case. 
After carefully reviewing this matter, the court finds that while Petitioner's motion and 
supporting affidavit were filed timely and accompanied with a certificate of good faith, they are 
unsupported by sufficient facts or evidence showing bias, prejudice, or a conflict of interest. The 
court finds that Petitioner has failed to show by affidavit or any other form of evidence that Judge 
Willmore did anything more than simply preside over the marriage ceremony. Petitioner has failed 
2 
to present any evidence, beyond mere speculation (i.e., her unsupported opinion as to the nature of 
the relationship between Judge Willmore and those involved in the marriage ceremony and this 
case), that Judge Willmore engaged in any interaction with the parties or their counsel during the 
marriage ceremony that might reasonably question the judge's impartiality. Petitioner's cursory 
allegation of bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest pertains to a completely unrelated context—a 
marriage ceremony—and is an insufficient basis for disqualification. As set forth above, Judge 
Willmore has stated on the record that he has not had any discussions with any of the parties or their 
attorneys relative to this case prior to or subsequent to Judge Judkins' recusal from the case and 
Petitioner has not presented any evidence to rebut or reasonably question the judge's statement on 
the record. 
Therefore, the court finds that Petitioner's affidavit is legally insufficient to support Judge 
Willmore's recusal and hereby denies Petitioner's Second Motion For Reassignment To A New 
Judge. This ruling constitutes the final order of the court on this issue. No further order is necessary 
to effectuate the court's decision. 
Dated this **'& day of January, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Mr. Dove, they're teI Iing me you 
were late. 
MR. DOVE: I was. I guess I owe you bagels, 
sir. Your clerk bagels. 
THE COURT: I was gonna say (Inaudible) days 
of trial (inaudible.) 
AM right, Counsel. This is the time set by 
the Court to rule after hearing the testimony in this 
matter. Is there anything else that should be said 
for either side that you'd I ike raised on the record 
before (inaudible.) 
MR. CHAMBERS: I can't think of anything, 
your Honor. 
MR. DOVE: No, your Honor. 
MR. CHAMBERS: I can't think of anything, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: AI I right. I'm gonna work my way 
through this. In doing this let me indicate to both 
sides that it is somewhat frustrating after the 
test i mony that I rece i ved (i naud i bIe.) 
I've sa i d in the past that somet i mes I fee I 
I i ke a computer; you put j unk i n, you get j unk back 
out. This particular case, you didn't put junk in. 
11's j ust Iong and convoIuted. 
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I sincerely appreciate the proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law both of you were --
both sides worked hard at putting that together and it 
greatly assisted the Court in going back through the 
test i mony. 
I guess what I'm saying is this is a tough 
case. There's a lot of different aspects to it. Both 
of you -- both s i des I th i nk d i d an exceI Ient j ob 
presenting your facts and positions. And hopefully my 
judgment here -- I'm sure it won't please either of 
you. But I think it wiI I be fair, and hopefully it 
wi I I be. 
The Court will order that the decree to enter 
and the divorce be granted to the parties (inaudible) 
based i rreconc iIabIe d i fferences. 
The Court is further going to order that the 
protective order that was previously issued be 
d i sm i ssed (i naud i bIe.) 
The --oh, and one other thing I should say 
is that this basis, this decision and entry today may 
be a basis for further negotiation between the 
parties. In other words, when I get through with this 
you may say, Wei I, that's fine and good, but you want 
to swap th i s for that? Or whatever (i naud i bIe.) 
The Nibley house. The Court finds that 
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the -- in the Nibley house that the Petitioner 
contributed to the construction of the same $108,000 
(i naud i bIe.) 
It is ordered that the home be sold. The 
first (inaudible) to come out of the income of the 
saIe of the house will be the cost of putt i ng the home 
in a sellable condition. The Court finds it should be 
approximately $25,000. 
Then the cost of the saIe will come out. And 
if that's I isted on the real estate market I think 
today (i naud i bIe) percent for the (i naud i bIe) about 
$33,000. 
And both of you have submitted some figures 
that you think that house is worth. I think the 
testimony that was introduced here to the Court 
indicates the house is worth about $550,000. I'm 
gonna telI you how I came up with the basis for that. 
Dust in Singleton testified that he evaluated 
the home. He inspected the house in 2005, 
November 2005. He thought the vaIue of the house was 
480,000 at that time if the foundation leak was fixed. 
(Inaudible) again 2007 he never really reappraised it. 
He did testify, however, in 2006 and 2007 
there has been a general growing increase in real 
estate between 5 and 10 percent. The Court has 
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calculated that to approximately a 5 to 8 percent 
increase, three years since 2005. 
He gave that a 16 percent increase 
(inaudible) year, that's a $76,800 increase. Which 
should put the house at about $556,800. If it took 
25,000 to fix the foundation, that sti I I leaves about 
$521,800. Again, we're talking in generalities. 
That was the testimony that was received 
(inaudible.) The Court's not now aware that since the 
case was first tried that there's been a decrease in 
the real estate market (inaudible) here, it's nation 
wide (inaudible.) So the Court anticipates that this, 
this house is going to bring somewhere around 550,000. 
Now, the Petitioner has 108,000 to come out 
of that. That will leave about 384,000. And out of 
that, Cache Valley Bank is to be satisfied, to the 
tune of 326,000. Which leaves about $58,000 left. 
If you divide that between the two of them, 
then that wi I I be somewhere around $30,000 that each 
side wiI I receive. And of course that wi I I be added 
to Pet i t i oner's 108,000 (i naud i bIe.) Now that, aga i n, 
i s rough. The best I can see i s (i naud i bIe.) 
Now, in addition, the Petitioner should 
receive credit for the increase in the value of her 
equity in the home. In other words, just about ten 
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years ago she put in 10,000 -- or $108,000. If you 
gave her 5 percent credit (inaudible) 5 percent 
increase during that 10 years, it wi I I come out about 
$54,000. 
However, the Court finds that the -- from the 
preponderance of the evidence that she disposed of 
many tools from the Nibley shed, cash in several safes 
in the house, and a I I of the guns of both parties, 
including those owned by the Respondent prior to the 
marriage. 
Therefore, the Court finds a wash or offset 
for those amounts. In other words, she receives no 
money from the sale of the house for the 10 years 
(inaudible.) However, she wi I I receive all the tools 
that were in the Nibley shed, and cash from several 
safes. 
In addition, the Court is going to grant her 
the Trendwest time share. She shall receive sole 
ownership of the Trendwest time share and shalI be 
so IeIy respons i bIe for any and a I I payments assoc i ated 
with (inaudible.) I think the approximate value of 
the time share is $6,500. 
The retirement accounts of the parties, which 
include Northwest Investment approximately $4,192, the 
AG I 401(k) of about $53,768, the URS 401(k) of about 
712_ 
Kelly L. WiIburn, CSR, RPR 
DepomaxMerit 
(April 16, 2008 - Olson v. Olson) 
$52,747, a 401(k) Janus fund $63,202, the 401(k) ME 
fund is 15 thousand (inaudible.) AI I of those are to 
be divided as per the Woodward formula. 
Now, in doing that let me indicate that I 
think this would be a good place for your (inaudible) 
negotiate further to see (inaudible) each take 
(inaudible) and offset the values. 
The Petitioner shall receive the Expedition 
vehicle, valued at $10,000. The Respondent shall 
receive the truck, whose value is $500. I must say 
that I'm somewhat (inaudible) I'm somewhat troubled by 
that rul ing. But the only testimony I have is that 
the vaIue of the truck i s $500 (i naud i bIe.) 
The Respondent shaI I rece i ve the co i n 
collection, including the remaining portions that are 
in the wife's possession. I set the value of that at 
$15,000. And I'll freely admit that's somewhat 
arbitrary. 
But when he received the bid that he 
received -- and I don't have it here, but I think it 
was $10,000 (inaudible.) And his wife appraised it to 
be about 18,000. So I (inaudible.) 
The Respondent is to be awarded the tools and 
equipment in the Hyrum storage shed, the value of 
which is $21,000. Now, the Court's fully aware that 
713 
Kelly L. WiIburn, CSR, RPR 
DepomaxMerit 
(April 16, 2008 - Olson v. Olson) 
Cache Valley Bank has a lien on those tools. But if 
they're satisfied out of the sale of the house, then 
that shouId remove that I i en (i naud i bIe.) 
And I don't know, my notes did not disclose 
whether there's a Ii en on the too Is that were I eft i n 
the Nibley shed. But if there is, again, they should 
be satisfied out of the sale of the proceeds of the 
house. She should be free to dispose of those 
(i naud i bIe.) 
He's to assume the debt to Capital Bui Iders 
and hold Petitioner harmless therefrom (inaudible.) 
And (inaudible) assume this $51,774 (inaudible.) 
She is to assume the debt to LKL and hold the 
Respondent harmless therefrom. And that (inaudible) 
is about 41,000, I show $40,955. 
Now this -- the next rul ing here again might 
be a basis for (inaudible) negotiation. The, the 
Respondent is to make -- in relation to personal 
property he i s to make two I i sts of equaI vaIue. And 
she wi I I then get the option to see which ones she 
wants. 
Now, pursuant to the request -- the Court's 
request, Mr. Chambers submitted a list of guns. There 
are no values (inaudible) those guns, but there is a 
Iist. The Court wiI I award to the Petitioner a I I the 
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guns on that I ist as Marian's guns. 
The Court wi I I award to the Respondent a I I 
the guns on that Ii st I i sted as Brad's persona I guns. 
The Court wiI I award to Marian a I I the guns I isted on 
the list as joint ownership. And in doing that I take 
into consideration that she did not receive any 
increase in the equity that she received. That 
$108,000 that she received (inaudible.) 
Now, the Court's aware that her testimony was 
to the effect that a I I those guns had been d i sposed 
of. I'll address that further in a minute. Now, this 
gets a Ii ttIe b i t compI i cated, but. AI I r i ght. 
He's been awarded $500 in the truck, $15,000 
in coins, $21,000 in tools, for a total of 
(inaudible.) 
She received the Expedition, which was valued 
at $10,000. And aga in, I'm not go i ng to take i nto 
account the tools, et cetera, the cash, because that's 
a wash between the, the equity that she has. 
She assumes a debt of $41,000. He assumes a 
debt of 61,775. So he has assumed $20,775 more than 
she does. That's why I say this gets a I ittle 
compIi cated. So she owes him $5,275 to equaI i ze that. 
However, he received $6,108 from Cash 
Investment Club, $2,277 from Ameritrade. So she gets 
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one-half of that, or $4,192. When you subtract the 
4,192 from the 5,275, that leaves a $1,083 balance 
that she owes to h i m to equaI i ze. 
Now, that $1,085 she can pay to him out of 
the proceeds from the saIe of the house. However, i f 
she can reclaim any of the guns that she claims that 
she sold (inaudible) the value of those guns wi I I be 
deducted from that $1,085, plus any other amounts 
wh i ch (i naud i bIe.) 
In other words, he may end up owing her out 
of sale of the house for those guns. Now, you haven't 
given me a value for the guns. But quite frankly I 
can probably come up with (inaudible) if you can't 
agree on it. 
If she finds the guns (inaudible) and you 
can't agree what that value is, from personal 
knowledge I can probably give you (inaudible.) 
Now, that gets us down to a Iimony. Her 
income as reflected in paragraph 15 of Mr. Chambers' 
proposed findings and conclusions will be accepted. 
And that shows her disposable net income was $2,977. 
The Court finds her monthly expenses 
submitted in Petitioner's Exhibit J is inflated by 
approximately $2,000. I find her needs to be about 
$4,200. 
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Now, arriving at that the Court took into 
consideration the fact that she's going receive 
somewhere around $140,000 from the sale of the house. 
That's her 108,000 plus the 30,000. So she's getting 
about 140,000 from that. 
And if she purchases a home -- and obviously 
the home would not be the same as the home she is now 
in. But if you take about a $200,000 house and put 
130,000, down she'd have to finance the rest. Her 
costs are going to be somewhere around six, seven 
hundred dollars to finance (inaudible) $200,000 house. 
Again, that's rough. 
She also has not put in her requested amount, 
that is her budget, anything for a future car. The 
Court is aware that the Expedition is paid for, but 
sooner or later that's (inaudible.) So I think her 
needs are about $1,000 (inaudible.) 
His needs somewhere around $6,800. The Court 
will accept -- and I'm sorry, I d i dn't wr i te down 
(inaudible.) I think it's paragraph 16 of 
Mr. Chambers' findings that relate to his income. As 
modified herein, his needs are about $6,800. 
His disposable income is -- that is net 
income, is about $6,000. Plus the bonus that he 
makes. The Court is fully aware that that bonus is 
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completely discretionary with his employer. 
Nevertheless, it is a -- that's what he received last 
year, and that's about all the Court can go on. So 
the Court is going to award that he pay her a Iimony, 
$1,000 per month. 
Now, her needs wi I I not be as I've described 
untiI the house is sold. So that a I imony wi I I not 
commence untiI 30 days after the close on the home. 
When that's sold, then he's to start paying her $1,000 
a month a Ii mony. 
And I should note in taking that into account 
Section 30-3-5(8)(a) (inaudible) sets forth the 
standard for alimony. The financial conditions, the 
needs of the recipient spouse, the Court has 
considered that. 
The recipient's earning capacity (inaudible) 
the Court has considered that. The abiI ity of the 
payor spouse to provide support. Also the length of 
marriage. Children does not enter into it at this 
time. 
Whether the recipient spouse worked in a 
business owned or operated by payor spouse. The Court 
makes a comment on that. I'm going to adopt for these 
rul ings the findings and conclusions as submitted by 
Mr. Chambers that there was a going-concern business, 
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but now there's no value to that business. 
The other thing to consider whether the 
recipient spouse (inaudible) contributed to any 
increase in payor spouse's skill (inaudible) 
education, or training while she contributed 18 years 
(inaudible) that business. 
And that's (inaudible) eighteen years 
experience. And so the a Iimony wi I I continue for that 
18 year period of time. 
The Court should also consider fault of the 
parties. There's been testimony here as to apparently 
what precipitated the divorce between the parties 
(i naud i bIe) the Respondent went to Reno and 
(inaudible.) 
However, I have not received sufficient 
information by way of testimony, quite frankly, to 
make a determination there. And I'm hesitant to 
estabIish a precedent in this, because if you do that 
then you open the door for why did he go to -- off the 
deep end. (Inaudible) 18 years with her, did she 
contribute to that. 
I'm not going to go into that. So quite 
frankly, I don't find that fault had anything to do 
with it. (Inaudible) if the Court goes into that much 
detail (inaudible) three or four days trial in cases 
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like this (inaudible) try and show one party did 
(inaudible) the other party and it's the other party's 
fau11 (i naud i bIe.) 
Now, the -- I will make a comment. Quite 
frankly I was -- the credibility of the Petitioner is 
in question. She made some statements under oath that 
concerned me. One was concerning the guns. That they 
had been sold. She couldn't remember to who or for 
how much. 
Also, there was confl icting testimony as to 
originations of how she paid off that time share. And 
I'll i nd i cate that even though she rece i ved the t i me 
share and there is a benefit there, (inaudible) have 
to be taken into consideration I suppose (inaudible) 
wash as that she received no benefit from the increase 
in vaIue (inaudibIe.) 
In other words, the -- she gets the time 
share, but there's (inaudible) attributed to 
Respondent except for (i naud i bIe.) 
The Court will award that each party bear 
their own attorney's fees and costs. However, the 
Court is aware too that the Respondent did not respond 
to certain discovery requests that were submitted, and 
so additional costs were incurred by Petitioner's 
attorney. 
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The Court will order, Mr. Chambers, you are 
to prepare the findings and conclusions (inaudible) if 
necessary to divide the investments as per the 
Woodward formula. That should offset any (inaudible) 
incurred there. Of course (inaudible) those to 
Mr. Dove before submitting them to the Court. 
Now, I'm sure the Court has not pleased 
e i ther of you tota My. I hope I haven't offended 
either of you totally. Are there any areas which I 
have not ruled on? 
MR. CHAMBERS: I can't think of any, your 
Honor. But if something comes up, could Counsel and I 
put a calI in to the Court and clarify that? 
THE COURT: Very we I I. Again, let me 
encourage you that the findings of the Court might be 
(inaudible) especially in complicated cases. For 
example personal property, where I said make your list 
and divide it up. 
11 very we I I may be that that g i ves you a 
basis to say, Okay, let's further negotiate 
(i naud i bIe.) That and I th i nk the i nvestments ruI i ng, 
the retirement (inaudible) gives you a basis to 
further negotiate. 
And of course if you can agree on anything, 
the Court will certa inly (i naud i bIe.) Very we I I. 
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MR. CHAMBERS: There is one additional item 
that Mr. Olson just -- I apologize. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible.) 
MR. CHAMBERS: In relationship to the coins. 
If we made arrangements with the sheriff deputy to go 
out to the house could he pick those up today? Just 
because there's been an issue with regards to the 
personal property the longer it goes. And so while he 
is in town. 
THE COURT: You've obviously got to have some 
further communication because she's got a (inaudible) 
personal property (inaudible.) So I'll let the 
attorneys work that out. 
Now, I -- as of right now, though, that 
protective order is no longer in place. I'll make 
that a verbal order so he can go take care of that. 
However let me caution you that, although that I 
removed the old protective order, that if additional 
problems arise the Court wiI I grant a new order 
(i naud i bIe.) 
MR. CHAMBERS: Just so the Court's aware, 
I've advised Mr. Olson while he's here to get this 
situation resolved to be with some other party 24/7 
and then go back to Vegas, because I don't want a 
probI em. 
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THE COURT: That's good advice. The more 
peopIe invoIved in this (inaudibIe.) I think at this 
point in time he should receive ownership of what he's 
(inaudible.) 
Anything else? 
MR. CHAMBERS: Thank you. 
MR. DOVE: I think that's it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court is in recess. 
(End of recording.) 
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Marshalling of the Evidence 
Concerning the Trial Court's Findings as to Commingling and/or Veil 
Piercing 
Brad Olson may argue that a marshalling exercise would be necessary to 
overcome the court's finding of fact concerning commingling which is found in 
the record at pages 671-72. Appellant does not agree that a marshalling exercise is 
necessary because Utah Code Ann 30-2-5 prohibits the court from entertaining the 
result achieved. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, Appellant Marian Olson 
hereby sets forth marshalling of evidence on that issue. 
A. Evidence Tending to Support the Court's Findings of Fact 
This subsection summarizes all evidence in the record which tends to 
support the trial court's findings of fact that commingling and/or veil piercing 
should occur as set forth in Finding of Fact #15 and #17. R. 671-72. This 
subsection sets forth all facts in the record which might be construed in a light 
favorable to Brad Olson on that issue. It appears that Brad Olson believed that 
because he allegedly traded out several aspects of the construction of the Nibley 
house back in year that such constituted unreported income to B&B Drywall, Inc. 
and that because it was put into the house, it benefitted the parties and not B&B 
Drywall to such an extent that the corporate veil should be pierced. The evidence 
showing Brad's assertions regarding the commingling theory is as follows: 
1. Brad testified that he performed trades with certain 
subcontractors through B&B Drywall and not him personally. Tr. 
201, lines 8-23. 
2. Brad testified that he had records of what materials and 
subcontractors expenses went into the construction of the Nibley 
house. Tr. 200, line 23 - p. 201, line 7. 
3. Brad testified that several personal items were purchased with 
B&B funds. Tr. 114, line 20 - 115, line 6 and Tr. 519 line 25 -
520, line 7. 
4. Brad's woodworking tools were purchased with B&B funds. Tr. 
227, lines 17-25. 
5. Brad testified that B&B Drywall supplied labor to build the 
Nibley house. Tr. 200, line 25 and R. 202 lines 2 - 1 6 . 
6. The Trendwest timeshare was partially purchased with funds of 
the corporation. Tr. 497, lines 11-17. 
7. Marian recalls that the home office furniture was likely 
purchased by B&B Drywall (Tr. 352 lines 6-11) and perhaps a 
few other items. Tr. 350, lines 6-24. 
8. Marian testified that the construction of the home may have 
included one trade with one subcontractor. Tr. 333, lines 3-14. 
B. Evidence Tending Not to Support the Court's Ruling 
There is abundant evidence in the record which does not support the trial 
court's ruling on the commingling/veil piercing issue. This subsection shows all 
of that evidence. 
1. B&B Drywall, Inc. was incorporated in about 1991. Tr. 107, lines 7-
12. 
2. B&B Drywall, Inc. had appointed officers and directors. Tr. 107, 
lines 7-12. 
3. B&B Drywall, Inc. employed an outside accountant. Tr. 439. 
4. A separate tax return for B&B Drywall, Inc. was prepared by a 
certified public accountant. Tr. 439-442. 
5. B&B shareholders and officers held corporate meetings. Tr. P. 252, 
lines 2-21. 
6. B&B shareholders and officers maintained a corporate book. Tr. 
252, lines 2-21. 
7. The Cache Valley Bank loans were obtained for business purposes. 
Tr.425 1ine22-4261inel2. 
8. Cache Valley Bank essentially treated the corporation as a separate 
entity from its shareholders. Tr. 425 line 22 - 426 line 12. 
9. B&B Drywall, Inc. averaged from 30-45 employees and had as 
many as 75 employees at one time. Tr. 198, lines 4-23. 
10. Separate revenue and expense records were maintained by B&B 
Drywall, Inc. See Brad's Trial Exhibit Tab 6. 
11. The alleged trades occurred approximately 7 years before the unpaid 
notes to Cache Valley Bank. (The parties moved into the Nibley 
home in October 1997. Tr. 199, lines 7-9 while the two Cache 
Valley Bank notes in question were obtained in 2004-2005. Tr. 153, 
lines 8-16.) 
12. Marian did not sign the personal guarantee with Cache Valley Bank. 
Tr. 433-34. 
13. The revenue of B&B Drywall, Inc. for the first half of 2005 was 
$1,949,770.68. Brad's Trial Exhibit Tab 6. 
14. Even Cache Valley Bank's representative testified that Marian Olson 
was not liable on the Cache Valley Bank notes. Tr. 466, lines 6-9. 
15. No documents were submitted to support Brad's assertions about the 
trades which occurred about ten years before the trial. See the 
Exhibits in general. 
16. Marian testified as to one trade only. Tr. 333, lines 3-14. She knew 
of no other trades as alleged by Brad. 
17. The corporation existed for at least 14 years before going into 
receivership. Tr. 11, lines 1-25. 
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18. The Trendwest timeshare was purchased with a business purpose of 
employee bonuses in mind. Tr. 497, lines 11-17. 
19. The Trendwest timeshare was actually purchased mostly with 
marital funds by Marian Olson after the divorce petition was filed. 
Tr. 270 and Tr. 357 lines 8-15. 
C. An Analysis of All Evidence Shows That the Trial Court's 
Conclusions Regarding Commingling/Veil-Piercing Are in Error. 
A thorough analysis of the evidence submitted by Brad Olson shows that it 
is insufficient to meet the standard elements necessary to show that the corporate 
veil of B&B Drywall, Inc. should be pierced. When all such evidence is balanced 
in light of the high standard concerning veil-piercing and the reluctance of court's 
to make such a conclusion, there simply is not enough evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's finding of fact numbers 15 and 17. Brad's testimony was 
way too general to be conclusive. "We did several jobs for contractors and did 
some trades." Tr. 201, lines 15-16. This assertion is merely a self-serving 
statement and does not serve to prove the extent of or the details of the alleged 
commingling. Actual documentary evidence or evidence from one of the 
companies that he allegedly traded perhaps would be probative—not just his own 
self-serving and conclusory allegation. Much more evidence should be required to 
pierce the corporate veil. 
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In light of the other evidence that B&B was a large multi-million dollar 
company which followed corporate formalities and generally treated the husband 
and wife as separate from the company, there simply was not enough evidence 
produced to meet Brad's burden of proof on this issue. The lack of independent 
documentation or other support for Brad's assertions is problematic for the veil-
piercing theory. Brad did no more than demonstrate that on a few occasions over 
a 14 year period that the line between corporate and personal expenses may have 
been blurred, but he did not meet his burden of showing "such a unity of interest 
and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual 
no longer exist." Norman v. Murray, 596 P.2d at 1030. The fact that Brad's 
theory served such a selfish purpose on his part should cause skepticism as to his 
motives in making such conclusory allegations. Clearly B&B Drywall, Inc. had a 
separate existence which he failed to prove was legally ignored. In summary, 
Brad did not produce sufficient evidence to support a conclusion of veil-piercing. 
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